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The Newly-Enacted CPLR 3408 for
Easing the Mortgage Foreclosure
Crisis: Very Good Steps, but not
Legislatively Perfect
Hon. Mark C. Dillon*
Introduction
There was only one mortgage foreclosure action filed in
Putnam County, New York, in 2005.1 Three years later, in
2008, there were fifty-three mortgage foreclosure actions filed
in the same county,2 representing a 5,200% increase in
foreclosures in three years. In Orange County, New York,
eight mortgage foreclosure actions were filed in 2005.3 In 2008,
the number of new mortgage foreclosure actions rose to an even
1,200,4 representing a 14,200% increase in such filings. In
Westchester County during the same time frame, the number
of foreclosures rose from 565 to 1,676,5 which is not as stunning
as the increases that occurred in Putnam and Orange Counties,
but still more than a threefold increase. The crisis in subprime
lending that developed in 2007, 2008, and 2009 prompted a

* Mark C. Dillon (Colgate University B.A., New York University M.A.,
Fordham Law School J.D.) is a Justice of the Appellate Division of the New
York State Supreme Court, Second Judicial Department. He is also an
Adjunct Professor of New York Practice at Fordham Law School, where he
was voted by the school’s student body as Adjunct Professor of the Year in
2009. The author acknowledges the assistance of the following persons
involved in the acquisition of certain statistical information used for this
article: Chief Administrative Judge Ann T. Pfau, Paul Lewis, Esq. of the New
York State Office of Court Administration, Administrative Judge for the
Ninth Judicial District Alan D. Scheinkman, and Nancy Barry, Esq. of his
office.
1. Statistics provided by the New York State Unified Court System,
Foreclosure Cases Filed, by county (2005-2008).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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significant increase in foreclosures in many counties in the
State of New York. Nationally, 860,000 homes were sold in
foreclosure in 2008.6 In the third quarter of 2009 alone,
foreclosures reached a record national high of 937,840 homes
that received a default notice, an auction notice, or that were
repossessed by a bank.7
The New York State Legislature endeavored to cope with
the dramatic increase in mortgage foreclosures by enacting a
variety of statutes that are known, in omnibus form, as the
The
Subprime Residential Loan and Foreclosure Laws.8
statutes included in the omnibus legislation are RPL 265-b,
RPAPL 1302, 1303 and 1304, Banking Law 6-l, 6-m, 590-b and
595-599, GOL 5-301(3), and, as central to this Article, CPLR
3408.9 CPLR 3408 is, therefore, a piece of a broader statutory
mosaic.
This Article examines the newly-enacted CPLR 3408 as it
pertains to foreclosure actions filed in the State of New York.
As will be shown below, CPLR 3408 fulfills a worthwhile
purpose of requiring early settlement conferences with the trial
courts, in the hope of preserving family home ownership,
particularly for minorities and the poor, who are, statistically,
most affected by the crisis in subprime mortgages.10 As will
also be shown below, however, the language of the legislation
presents minor procedural flaws that can be rectified by judges
6. Foreclosures More than Doubled in 2008, MSNBC, Jan. 15, 2009,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28663624/.
7. Les Christie, Foreclosures: Worst Three Months of All Time, CNN, Oct.
15, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/10/15/real_estate/foreclosure_crisis_
deepens/?postversion=2009101507. Care must be taken when examining
foreclosure statistics, as some reported statistics focus upon only the number
of homes actually sold at foreclosure auctions, whereas others—including
those at issue here—include homeowners who merely receive default notices
and auction notices, which precede foreclosure sales.
8. 2008 N.Y. Laws ch. 472. See also LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Novetti,
889 N.Y.S.2d 506, No. 6535-08, 2009 WL 1810511, at *2 (Sup. Ct. June 15,
2009) (unreported disposition); Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Edsall, 880 N.Y.S.2d
877, No. 3523-07, 2009 WL 175029, at *3 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 22, 2009) (unreported
disposition).
9. 2008 N.Y. Laws ch. 472. See also Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 2009 WL
175029, at *3.
10. See Michael Powell & Janet Roberts, Minorities Hit Hardest as New
York Foreclosures Rise, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2009, at A1. See also Manny
Fernandez, In Confronting the Foreclosure Crisis, A Bill Strikes a Balance,
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2008, at A25.
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who are sensitive to the overriding purpose and intent of the
statute. This Article is written with the hope and expectation
that its subject matter is legally, economically, and socially
timely.
I.

The Particulars of CPLR 3408 as Originally Enacted

An appropriate starting point is the language of CPLR
3408. The statute, which does not have a predecessor,11
became effective on August 5, 2008.12 Because the statute is
relatively new, as of this writing, only a limited body of case
law has been generated at the trial level. Few issues involving
CPLR 3408 have had sufficient time to percolate to any of the
state’s four Appellate Divisions for statutory interpretation and
application.
The original language of CPLR 3408 reads, in pertinent
part,
(a) In any residential foreclosure action involving
a high-cost home loan consummated between
January first, two thousand three and
11. While there is no statutory predecessor to CPLR 3408, the New York
State Judiciary was ahead of the Legislature in recognizing the potential
value of early settlement conferences in residential foreclosure actions. A
report entitled RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES: PROMOTING EARLY
COURT INTERVENTION was issued in June 2008 by then-Chief Judge Judith
Kaye and by Chief Administrative Judge Ann Pfau. The report recognized
the significant spike in residential foreclosure actions filed in the State of
New York and the effect of foreclosures upon families, neighborhoods, banks,
and the economy. It summarized the creation of a pilot Early Foreclosure
Conference Part in Queens County where, under local rules, homeowner
defendants could request, pursuant to written notice served with the
summons and complaint, a court conference. The conference was to be held
within sixty days from the filing of a Request for Judicial Intervention, which
was to be purchased at the time proof of service was filed with the clerk of the
court. The purpose of the conference was to streamline foreclosure litigations
for lenders and to encourage settlements between the parties. N.Y. STATE
UNIFIED COURT SYS., RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES: PROMOTING
EARLY COURT INTERVENTION, at 2-4 [hereinafter N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT
SYS.
Report],
available
at
http://www.nycourts.gov/whatsnew/pdf/ResidentialForeclosure6-08.pdf. The
enactment of CPLR 3408 two months later, however, caused the pilot
program to be subsumed by the procedures required by the state statute.
12. 2008 N.Y. Laws ch. 472, § 3; Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 2009 WL
175029, at *4.
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September first, two thousand eight, or a
subprime or nontraditional home loan, as those
terms are defined under section thirteen hundred
four of the real property actions and proceedings
law, in which the defendant is a resident of the
property subject to foreclosure, the court shall
hold a mandatory conference within sixty days
after the date when proof of service is filed with
the country clerk, or on such adjourned date as
has been agreed to by the parties, for the purpose
of holding settlement discussions pertaining to
the relative rights and obligations of the parties
under the mortgage loan documents, including,
but not limited to determining whether the
parties can reach a mutually agreeable
resolution to help the defendant avoid losing his
or her home, and evaluating the potential for a
resolution in which payment schedules or
amounts may be modified or other workout
options may be agreed to, and for whatever other
purposes the court deems appropriate.
There are several words and phrases in CPLR 3408(a) that
are noteworthy. These include the stated purpose of the
statute, the types of mortgages and defendants within its
scope, and its chronological and procedural requirements.
Each is discussed below.
A. The Stated Purpose and Intent of CPLR 3408
It is striking that within the original single paragraph of
CPLR 3408(a), the terms ―settlement,‖ ―resolution,‖ and
―agreed to‖ appear a total of five times. The terms underscore
the purpose and legislative intent of the statute. CPLR 3408
was enacted to foster the early settlement of foreclosure actions
as a means of preserving home ownership and to mitigate the
subprime credit crisis, through the mandated auspices of the
courts.13 The law requires that a conference be conducted in
13. See Sponsor’s Mem., Bill Jacket, L.2008, ch. 472, available at
http://image.iarchives.nysed.gov/images/images/142344.pdf. See also LaSalle
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foreclosure actions between the parties and the court, for the
purpose of, inter alia, determining whether the parties can
resolve the litigation and keep families in their homes by
adjusting payment schedules or the amounts due.14 Previously,
there had been no such settlement conference requirement in
New York. Professor David Siegel notes that since the state is
unable to alter, ex post facto, the laws that were in effect when
mortgage transactions were undertaken, a settlement
conference between the parties under the auspices of the court
may be the next best alternative to minimize the number of
home foreclosures.15
Any adjustments that could be made in payment schedules
or amounts due as a result of the conference benefit, in the first
instance, the defendants being foreclosed upon. A 2009 report
of the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University
School of Law has identified the secondary benefits arising out
of foreclosure settlements, beyond the obvious benefit of
preserving families in their homes and communities.16 These
secondary benefits are to neighborhoods whose property values
decline as a result of foreclosures,17 municipalities that lose a
portion of their local tax revenue,18 higher crime rates that
have been linked to foreclosure rates, 19 and lenders that often
Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 2009 WL 1810511, at *2; David D. Siegel, Legislature
Mandates Settlement Conference in Residential Foreclosure Actions in Effort
to Ease Subprime Mortgage Crisis, SIEGEL’S PRAC. REV., Sept. 2008, at 3,
available at 201 SIEGELPR 3 (WestLaw); Abby Tolchinsky & Ellie
Wertheim, Bringing Borrowers and Lenders Together Under Foreclosure Law,
N.Y. L.J., May 8, 2009, at 3.
14. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408(a) (McKinney 2009). See also Siegel, Practice
Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 7B, CPLR C3408.
15. Siegel, supra note 13.
16. MELANCA CLARK & MAGGIE BARRON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE,
FORECLOSURES: A CRISIS IN LEGAL REPRESENTATION 7-8 (2009), available at
http://brennan.3cdn.net/a5bf8a685cd0885f72_s8m6bevkx.pdf.
17. Id. at 7-8 (citing Jenny Schuetz, Vicki Been & Ingrid Gould Ellen,
Neighborhood Effects of Concentrated Mortgage Foreclosures 17 (N.Y.U.
Center for Law & Econ., Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper
No. 08-41, Sept. 18, 2008)).
The paper correlates the proximity of
foreclosures to reductions in home sales prices in the same areas.
18. Id. at 8 (citing generally WILLIAM C. APGAR & MARK DUDA,
COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE MUNICIPAL IMPACT OF TODAY’S MORTGAGE
FORECLOSURE BOOM (May 11, 2005)).
19. Id. (citing Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The Impact of SingleFamily Mortgage Foreclosures on Neighborhood Crime, 21 HOUSING STUD.
851, 862 (2006)).
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lose money from the foreclosures.20
B. The Mortgages to Which CPLR 3408 Originally Applied
A second noteworthy aspect of CPLR 3408(a) is the
statute’s built-in definition of the types of mortgage foreclosure
actions for which the mandatory settlement conferences
originally applied. Three types of applicable mortgages were
specified.21 One was the ―subprime‖ loan as defined by RPAPL
1304.22 A second was the ―nontraditional home loan‖ as
defined by RPAPL 1304.23 The third was the ―high-cost home
loan‖ as defined by Banking Law 6-l.24 The statutory language
suggests that care was taken in isolating the mortgages that
are within the scope of the statute. These three types of
mortgages are more susceptible to default during times of
declining housing values, as they represent the greatest
expense to the riskiest of borrowers. The settlement conference
mandated by the original version of CPLR 3408 did not apply
to actions involving a mortgage other than one of the types
specified in the statute.25 Accordingly, ―traditional‖ home loans
were not within the defined scope of the statute.
The three mortgages identified in CPLR 3408 have
different meanings. A ―subprime‖ loan is defined as a home
loan consummated between January 1, 2003 and September 1,
2008 secured by a mortgage or deed of trust on real estate upon
which there is located, or is to be located, one or more
structures intended to be used principally for occupation by one
to four families, including the borrower, and for which the
terms of the loan exceed a ―threshold‖ defined in RPAPL
20. Id. (citing PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, DEFAULTING ON THE DREAM:
STATES RESPOND TO AMERICA’S FORECLOSURE CRISIS 2, 11 (2008);
Homeownership Preservation Foundation, About Foreclosure, Common
Myths,
http://www.995hope.org/about-foreclosure/common-myths/ (last visited Feb.
14, 2010)).
21. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408(a) (McKinney 2009).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.; N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-l(1)(d).
25. See Emigrant Mortgage Co., Inc. v. Turk, 895 N.Y.S.2d 722 (App.
Div. 2010); Trustco Bank v. Alexander, 886 N.Y.S.2d 69, No. 2008-3351, 2009
WL 1425247, at *1 (Sup. Ct. May 12, 2009) (unreported disposition).
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1304(5)(d).26 For first lien mortgage loans, the threshold is
exceeded when the annual percentage rate of the home loan, at
the time of consummation, is three or more percentage points
over the yield on treasury securities with comparable periods of
maturity, measured as of the fifteenth day of the month in
which the loan was consummated.27 For subordinate mortgage
liens, the threshold is five or more percentage points over the
treasury security yields.28 Subprime home loans do not include
transactions to finance the initial construction of a dwelling,
temporary or ―bridge‖ loans with a term of twelve months or
less, or home equity lines of credit.29 If any home loan offers
percentage terms that are lower during an initial or
introductory period, with a higher rate after the end of such
period, the threshold is determined by using the rate that
becomes applicable after the initial or introductory period.30
A ―nontraditional home loan‖ is defined as a payment
option adjustable rate mortgage, or an interest only mortgage,
consummated between January 1, 2003 and September 1,
2008.31
A ―high-cost home loan‖ is defined in Banking Law 6-l. Its
definition is more complicated than the definitions of subprime
and nontraditional home loans. A high-cost home loan is a
separately-defined ―home loan‖32 that presents the additional
component of being ―high-cost.‖ A ―home loan‖ is defined in
Banking Law 6-l(1)(e) as a debt incurred by a natural person
for personal, family, or household purposes, secured by a
mortgage or deed of trust upon New York State real estate that
is used as a principal dwelling for one to four families.33 A
―home loan‖ must also reflect a principal amount that does not
exceed the conforming size limit for a comparable dwelling,
established periodically by the federal national mortgage
association.34 Home loans do not include ―reverse mortgage‖
26. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1304(5)(c).
27. Id. § 1304(5)(d).
28. Id. See also Accredited Home Lenders, Inc. v. Hughes, 866 N.Y.S.2d
860, 862-63 (Sup. Ct. 2008).
29. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1304(5)(c).
30. Id. § 1304(5)(d).
31. Id. § 1304(5)(e); Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 866 N.Y.S.2d at 862.
32. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-l(1)(e).
33. Id. § 6-l(1)(e)(ii)-(v).
34. Id. § 6-l(1)(e)(i).
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transactions.35 A home loan becomes ―high-cost‖ when the
terms of the loan exceed a threshold defined by Banking Law 6l(1)(g).36 This threshold is met for first lien mortgage loans
when the annual percentage rate of the home loan at the time
of consummation exceeds ―eight percentage points over the
yield on treasury securities having comparable periods of
maturity to the loan maturity measured as of the fifteenth day
of the month immediately preceding the month in which the
application for the extension of credit is received by the
lender.‖37 For subordinate mortgage liens, the threshold is
nine percentage points above the treasury security yields.38 As
with subprime loans, if any home loan offers percentage terms
that are lower during an initial or introductory period, with a
higher rate after the end of such period, the threshold is
determined by using the rate applicable after the initial or
introductory period.39 As an alternative to the threshold, a
home loan will become ―high-cost‖ if total points and fees
exceed 5% of the total amount of the loan for loans of $50,000
or more; or 6% of the total loan amount of $50,000 or more and
the loan is a purchase money loan guaranteed by either the
Federal
Housing
Administration
or
the
Veterans
Administration; or the greater of 6% or $1,500, if the total loan
amount is less than $50,000.40
35. Id. § 6-l(1)(e).
36. Id. § 6-l(1)(d). See generally LaSalle Bank, N.A. II v. Shearon, 881
N.Y.S.2d 599, 604-06 (Sup. Ct. 2009).
37. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-l(1)(g)(i).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. § 6-l(1)(g)(ii). The statute provides for a deduction of up to two
bona fide loan discount points payable by the borrower, if the interest rate
from which the loan interest rate is discounted does not exceed by more than
one percentage point the yield on U.S. treasury securities having comparable
maturity measured from the fifteenth day of the month immediately
preceding the month in which the application was received, id. § 6l(1)(g)(ii)(1), and all bona fide loan discount points funded directly or
indirectly through grants from federal, state, or local agencies or tax exempt
organizations, id. § 6-l(1)(g)(ii)(2). Certain high-cost home loan practices are
expressly prohibited by the BANKING LAW, including acceleration provisions
absent default by the borrower, id. § 6-l(2)(a)), balloon payments that are
more than twice as large as the average of earlier scheduled payments, id. §
6-l(2)(b), negative amortization by which regular periodic payments cause an
increase in the principal balance, id. § 6-l(2)(c), interest rate increases as a
result of the borrower’s default, id. § 6-l(2)(d), the application of more than
two periodic payments paid in advance from the borrower’s loan proceeds, id.
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The three types of mortgages underlying the 2008 version
of CPLR 3408(a) had one additional significant element in
common: namely, that they apply to residential mortgages
only.41 Commercial mortgages are noticeably absent from the
language of CPLR 3408, RPAPL 1304, and Banking Law 6-l.
The language of CPLR 3408 suggests that the legislature’s
intent of curbing mortgage foreclosures is directed only at
residential home ownership, and does not extend to
businesses.42
No cases have yet been reported where parties have
conclusively litigated whether the mortgage at issue was
within, or without, the scope of CPLR 3408. One case that
came close was Accredited Home Lenders, Inc. v. Hughes, in
which the plaintiff and the defendant differed on the question
of how the mortgage between them should be classified for
purposes of CPLR 3408.43 The defendant argued that the
mortgage was a nontraditional home mortgage, whereas the
§ 6-l(2)(e), fees for certain loan modifications, renewals, extensions or
amendments, id. § 6-l(2)(f), oppressive mandatory arbitration clauses, id. § 6l(2)(g), the financing of insurance or other defined products, id. § 6- l(2)(h),
loan ―flipping,‖ id. § 6-l(2)(i), the refinancing of special mortgages, id. § 6l(2)(j), lending without verification of the borrower’s ability to repay, id. § 6l(2)(k), lending without counseling disclosure, id. § 6-l(2)(l), the financing of
points and fees, id. § 6-l(2)(m), the payment of home improvement contractors
from loan proceeds, id. § 6-l(2)(n), the encouragement of the borrower’s
default, id. § 6-l(2)(o), payments to mortgage brokers other than for goods and
facilities actually furnished or services actually performed, id. § 6-l(2)(p),
points and fees for refinancing a high-cost home loan to a new high-cost home
loan, id. § 6- l(2)(q), prepayment penalties, id. § 6-l(2)(r), abusive yield spread
premiums, id. § 6-l(2)(s), the non-collection by the lender of tax and insurance
escrow for loans to be consummated after July 1, 2010, id. § 6-l(2)(t), the nondisclosure by the lender of taxes and insurance, id. § 6-l(2)(u), and ―teaser
rates‖ having a duration of less than six months, id. § 6-l(2)(v). The statute
provides for penalties in the form of consequential and incidental damages,
civil penalties, and attorneys fees, as well as equitable and injunctive relief,
in the event that violations by lenders are proven by a preponderance of the
evidence. Id. §§ 6-l(7) – (11). See generally LaSalle Bank, N.A. v. Shearon,
850 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 2008).
41. See Governor’s Program Bill Mem., Summary of Provisions, Bill
Jacket, L.2008, ch. 472.
42. See Siegel, supra note 13; Governor’s Program Bill Mem., Summary
of Provisions, Bill Jacket, L.2008, ch. 472; Press Release, Governor David A.
Paterson, Governor Paterson Signs Comprehensive Reforms to Address
Foreclosure
Crisis
(Aug.
5,
2008),
available
at
http://www.ny.gov/governor/press/press_0805081.html.
43. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc. v. Hughes, 866 N.Y.S.2d 860, 862-63
(Sup. Ct. 2008).
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plaintiff contended that the mortgage could instead qualify as a
subprime home loan.44 The Supreme Court, Essex County, did
not need to reach this issue, as both types of mortgages
qualified under CPLR 3408, and as the dispositive issue
between the parties was whether the defendant resided in the
subject property as to trigger the settlement conference
requirement of the statute.45
Another case that touched upon the issue of whether a
residential mortgage fell within the scope of CPLR 3408 is
Butler Capital Corp. v. Cannistra.46 In Butler Capital Corp.,
the Supreme Court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a judgment
on default, as the plaintiff’s moving papers failed to establish
that the loan at issue was a subprime, non-traditional, or highcost home loan within the mandates of CPLR 3408.47
It is predicted here that before long, courts will be asked to
resolve disputes between parties in foreclosure actions on the
question of whether a particular loan, subject to the 2008
version of CPLR 3408, falls within or without the scope of
CPLR 3408 and its mandatory settlement conference
requirement.
The statute’s remedies have been held to be unavailable to
defendants who are actually engaged in duplicitous mortgage
schemes.48
C.

The Necessity of Defendants Residing at the Mortgaged
Premises

A third noteworthy aspect of CPLR 3408 is its residency
requirement. CPLR 3408 specifically applies to actions where
―the defendant is a resident of the property subject to
foreclosure.‖49 On the face of the statute, a borrower who is not

44. Id.
45. Id. at 863.
46. 891 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct. 2009).
47. Id. at 243.
48. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Edsall, 880 N.Y.S.2d 877, No.
3523-07, 2009 WL 175029, at *4 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 22, 2009) (unreported
disposition).
49. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408(a) (McKinney 2009) (emphasis added); U.S.
Bank, N.A. v. Flynn, No. 2010-20093, 2010 WL 936224, at *4 (Sup. Ct. Mar.
12, 2010).
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a resident of the property being foreclosed upon is not entitled
to the settlement conference mandated by CPLR 3408. The
issue of the borrower’s residence was important in Indymac
Federal Bank FSB v. Black.50 In Indymac, the defendant
entered into a subprime home loan, defaulted in her payment
obligations, and was served with process in the plaintiff’s
foreclosure action in Florida.51 The plaintiff argued that the
defendant was not entitled to a settlement conference under
CPLR 3408 as she had been located in Florida when process
was served and was not, therefore, a current resident of the
The Supreme Court,
property being foreclosed upon.52
Rensselaer County, disagreed, noting that the mere service of
process in Florida was insufficient evidence, in and of itself, to
demonstrate that the subject premises in New York was not
the defendant’s principal residence.53 By implication, had the
plaintiff presented the court with stronger evidence that the
defendant’s residence had in fact been relocated to Florida, the
court may have reached a different conclusion as to whether
the defendant qualified for a mandatory settlement conference.
One issue that was missed in Indymac is that under New
York law, a party may simultaneously have more than one
residence. A party may have only one ―domicile,‖ which is
physical presence in one state location with the intention that
the state be an actual and permanent home, but may have
multiple ―residences,‖ which is a looser term dependant upon a
person’s significant connections with states.54 CPLR 3408 does
not refer to a defendant’s domicile, or even to a defendant’s
―principal‖ residence, but instead requires that the defendant
merely be ―a resident of the property subject to foreclosure.‖
Accordingly, in a case such as Indymac, the defendant could be
a ―resident‖ of the New York property subject to foreclosure
even if that same defendant also owned a home in another
state (such as Florida), and was found there for service of
process.
According to one court, the language of CPLR 3408 does
50. 880 N.Y.S.2d 224, No. 226806, 2009 WL 211787 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 23,
2009) (unreported disposition).
51. Id. at *1-2.
52. Id. at *2.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Antone v. Gen. Motors Corp., 64 N.Y.2d 20, 28 (1984).
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not expressly address whether a foreclosure defendant must
reside at the property when the mortgage contract is executed,
or, rather, when the foreclosure action is commenced.55 This
difference is potentially significant.
In Accredited Home
Lenders, Inc. v. Hughes, the defendants entered into a
subprime home loan for property in Essex County, New York
and defaulted on their payment obligations.56 The defendants
were residing in New Jersey, either permanently or
temporarily, when the foreclosure action was later
commenced.57 The plaintiff argued that CPLR 3408 was
inapplicable, as the defendants’ residency in New Jersey meant
that they were not residents of the New York property that was
subject to foreclosure.58
The Supreme Court disagreed,
focusing on the language of RPAPL 1304 that is incorporated
into CPLR 3408, which defines subprime and nontraditional
home loans.59 The court noted that under RPAPL 1304, a
default notice must be transmitted to the borrower by
registered or certified mail and by regular mail at least ninety
days prior to the commencement of any foreclosure action, and
that such notice must be sent to the address of the mortgaged
premises or to the borrower’s last known address, if different.60
The court, therefore, viewed RPAPL 1304 as acknowledging
that borrowers of subprime and nontraditional home loans
might not live at the mortgaged property at the time
foreclosure actions are commenced, which is ambiguous when
juxtaposed against the language of CPLR 3408 that requires,
in present-tense language, that borrowers reside at the
mortgaged property.61 Finding the statute ambiguous, the
court stated that the legislative intent of CPLR 3408 was to
expansively benefit borrowers subject to subprime and
nontraditional home loans, other than owners of second homes

55. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc. v. Hughes, 866 N.Y.S.2d 860, 863
(Sup. Ct. 2008).
56. Id. at 862.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 863.
60. Id. See also N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1304(1), (2) (McKinney
2009).
61. Compare N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1304(2) with N.Y. C.P.L.R.
3408(a).
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or investment properties.62 The court held that CPLR 3408
was not intended to require borrowers to remain at their
mortgaged premises while foreclosure actions were being
prepared or were pending.63 The court, therefore, concluded
that even if the defendants had relocated their residence to
New Jersey, they were entitled to the mandatory settlement
conference conferred by CPLR 3408.64
The reasoning used by the court in Accredited Home
Lenders is arguably incorrect. Courts must interpret the
meaning of statutes by looking at the plain language used by
the legislature, as it is the clearest indicator of statutory
intent.65 Only when a statute is ambiguous will courts
examine the legislative history underlying the statute for
evidence of the legislature’s intent.66 Here, the language of
CPLR 3408(a) speaks purely in the present tense; the statute
applies to a defendant who ―is a resident of the property subject
to foreclosure.‖67 The terms ―is‖ and ―subject to foreclosure‖
necessarily pertain to the present tense, when a property is in
default and when a foreclosure action is pending. Reference by
the court in Accredited Home Lenders to the residence language
of RPAPL 1304 is misplaced, as RPAPL 1304 is only
incorporated by reference into CPLR 3408 for the limited
purpose of defining the meaning of ―subprime‖ and
―nontraditional‖ home loans.68 The language of CPLR 3408
that entitles the borrower to a settlement conference, where
―the defendant is a resident of the property subject to
62. Accredited Home Lenders Inc., 866 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Jones v. Bill, 890 N.E.2d 884 (N.Y. 2008); Bluebird Partners
L.P. v. First Fid. Bank, 767 N.E.2d 672, 674 (N.Y. 2002); Yong-Myun Rho v.
Ambach, 546 N.E.2d 188, 190 (N.Y. 1989); Sutka v. Connors, 538 N.E.2d
1012, 1015 (N.Y. 1989); Janssen v. Inc. Vill. of Rockville Ctr., 869 N.Y.S.2d
572, 581-82 (App. Div. 2008); Ragucci v. Prof’l Constr. Servs., 803 N.Y.S.2d
139, 142 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Majewski v. Broadalbin-Perth Cent. Sch.
Dist., 696 N.E.2d 978, 980 (N.Y. 1998)).
66. See, e.g., N.Y. STAT. LAW §§ 76, 94; Action Elec. Contractors, Inc. v.
Goldin, 474 N.E.2d 601, 604 (N.Y. 1984). See also Ferres v. City of New
Rochelle, 502 N.E.2d 972, 975 (N.Y. 1986); Uniformed Firefighters Ass’n,
Local 94 v. Beekman, 420 N.E.2d 938, 941 (N.Y. 1981); Tutunjian v. Conroy,
865 N.Y.S.2d 768, 770 (App. Div. 2008); Kearns v. Piatt, 716 N.Y.S.2d 418,
419 (App. Div. 2000).
67. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408(a) (emphasis added).
68. Id.
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foreclosure,‖69 is explicit and unambiguous. The present-tense
language of the residency requirement of CPLR 3408(a) trumps
any seemingly inconsistent language in RPAPL 1304, as only
CPLR 3408 defines the circumstances under which the
defendant is entitled to the statute’s mandated settlement
conference. Consequently, an argument can be made that,
contrary to the conclusion reached in Accredited Home Lenders,
the better construction of CPLR 3408 is to apply its residency
requirement to defendants as of the time the action is
commenced to foreclose upon the property, remove the
borrower occupants, and pass title through a court-appointed
referee.
In a significant portion of foreclosure actions, the plaintiffs
eventually file summary judgment motions under CPLR 3212.
CPLR 3408 contains no language prohibiting the filing and
service of summary judgment motions prior to the required
settlement conferences mandated by CPLR 3408. Presumably,
if a summary judgment motion is filed before the parties have
had an opportunity to conduct the settlement conference, the
court will need to hold the motion in abeyance until the
conference is completed, since granting any such motion earlier
would defeat the purpose of the statute. Some plaintiffs might
nevertheless file their summary judgment motions early in
foreclosure litigations, as a means of increasing their leverage
over defendants during the settlement discussions that will
occur while the motions are pending. Other plaintiffs might
delay summary judgment motions until conferences are held
and determined to be unsuccessful, which is an approach more
consistent with the purpose and intent of the statute.70
69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. On occasion, plaintiffs in foreclosure actions file and serve motions
for summary judgment in lieu of a complaint under CPLR 3213. See, e.g.,
Dyck-O’Neal, Inc. v. Thomson, 868 N.Y.S.2d 838 (App. Div. 2008); Lakeville
Manor, Inc. v. KBK Enters., LLC, 772 N.Y.S.2d 591 (App. Div. 2003);
Gregorio v. Gregorio, 651 N.Y.S.2d 599 (App. Div. 1996); F.D.I.C. v. De
Cresenzo, 616 N.Y.S.2d 638 (App. Div. 1994); Norton Co. v. C-TC 9th Ave.
P’ship, 603 N.Y.S.2d 364 (App. Div. 1993); Joswick v. Rossi, 593 N.Y.S.2d 257
(App. Div. 1993); Stern v. Chemical Bank, 372 N.Y.S.2d 913, 916 (Civ. Ct.
1975). Such motions may only be filed when the action is based upon an
instrument for the payment of money—like a note—and cannot be used for
equitable relief such as the court-ordered sale of the property and the eviction
of the defendant. In foreclosure actions where the defendant is not subject to
sale and eviction, the defendant would ordinarily not be a resident of the
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D. Internal Chronological Limitations
A fourth noteworthy aspect of CPLR 3408(a) is its
chronological limitations.
CPLR 3408 originally became
effective as of August 5, 2008.71 It applies only to foreclosure
actions commenced on or after that date,72 as distinguished
from actions already pending by that date.73
The 2008 version of the statute also provides that the
mandatory settlement conference applies only to foreclosure
actions involving ―high-cost‖ mortgages executed between
January 1, 2003 and September 1, 2008.74 These dates
presumably apply to the time period during which there were
lax mortgage underwriting standards. A close reading of the
original language of CPLR 3408(a) reveals that the time
limitations are applied to foreclosure actions involving ―highcost home loan[s],‖ and that no corresponding time limitation is
expressly applied to actions involving subprime mortgages or
nontraditional home loans.75
The time limitations for
applicable mortgages are set-off in CPLR 3408(a) by commas in
connection with high-cost home loans, but are not similarly setoff with respect to either subprime or nontraditional home
loans.76 This may merely be inartful draftsmanship, or the
Legislature might have intended that no chronological
limitation apply to subprime or nontraditional mortgages. As
of this writing, no case has yet addressed the applicability of
CPLR 3408 to subprime or nontraditional home mortgages
executed outside of the time frame between January 1, 2003
and September 1, 2008.

property. Accordingly, it would appear that in actions where plaintiffs seek
summary judgment in lieu of a complaint under CPLR 3213, the absence of
the defendant’s residence in the property would render the settlement
conference of CPLR 3408 inapplicable.
71. 2008 N.Y. Laws ch. 472, § 3.
72. See Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y.,
Book 7B, CPLR C3408. See also LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Novetti, 889
N.Y.S.2d 506, No. 6535-08, 2009 WL 1810511, at *2 (Sup. Ct. June 15, 2009)
(unreported disposition).
73. LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 2009 WL 1810511, at *2.
74. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408(a).
75. Id. 3408.
76. Id.
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E. The Statute’s Non-Retroactivity
Statutes in New York are generally presumed to have
prospective application, unless their language expressly or
impliedly requires a retroactive construction.77 CPLR 3408
contains no language indicating that it may be applied to
actions pending prior to its effective date.78
One case confirms the absence of retroactivity, LaSalle
Bank National Ass’n v. Novetti.79 LaSalle Bank involved a
foreclosure action commenced on February 13, 2008, prior to
the effective date of CPLR 3408.80 The defendant initially
defaulted in appearing and answering the plaintiff’s
complaint.81 An order of reference was rendered on September
16, 2008, after the effective date of CPLR 3408, and was
followed by a judgment of foreclosure and sale executed by the
court on January 26, 2009.82 Thereafter, on February 5, 2009,
counsel for the defendant, who had belatedly appeared in the
action, demanded a settlement conference and moved to stay
the foreclosure sale pending the conduct of the conference.83
The Supreme Court, Suffolk County, denied the defendant the
settlement conference contemplated by CPLR 3408 on the
ground that the foreclosure action had been commenced prior
to the effective date of the statute.84 The court’s ruling appears
to be correct. If CPLR 3408 is viewed as a remedial statute,
77. See N.Y. STAT. LAW § 51(b), (c). E.g., Duell ex rel. Estate of Duell v.
Condon, 647 N.E.2d 96, 100 (N.Y. 1995); Dorfman v. Leidner, 565 N.E.2d 472,
474 (N.Y. 1990); Thomas v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 470 N.E.2d 831, 833 (N.Y.
1984); Beary v. City of Rye, 377 N.E.2d 453, 459 (N.Y. 1978); Deutsch v.
Catherwood, 294 N.E.2d 193, 194 (N.Y. 1973); County of Herkimer v. Daines,
876 N.Y.S.2d 303 (App. Div. 2009), leave to appeal denied, 876 N.Y.S.2d 804
(App. Div. 2009); State ex rel. Spitzer v. Daicel Chem. Indus., 840 N.Y.S.2d 8,
10-11 (App. Div. 2007); Chapman v. State, 690 N.Y.S.2d 328 (App. Div. 1999);
Wade v. Byung Yang Kim, 681 N.Y.S.2d 355, 356-57 (App. Div. 1998); Auger
v. State, 666 N.Y.S.2d 760, 762 (App. Div. 1997), after remand 693 N.Y.S.2d
343 (App. Div. 1999); Morales v. Gross, 657 N.Y.S.2d (App. Div. 1997).
78. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408.
79. 889 N.Y.S.2d 506, No. 6535-08, 2009 WL 1810511, at *1 (Sup. Ct.
June 15, 2009) (unreported disposition).
80. Id.
81. Id. at *1-2.
82. Id. at *2.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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intended to stem the rash of home foreclosures within the state
by providing defendant homeowners with a new right to a
settlement conference, then the statute—as with all statutes
that create new rights—is to be applied prospectively.85 If
CPLR 3408 is instead viewed as merely procedural in nature,
then it is to be applied in pending actions only as to procedural
steps to be undertaken after the statute’s enactment.86 In
LaSalle Bank, the 60-day settlement conference period had
presumably already passed by the time CPLR 3408 became
effective.
Separate from CPLR 3408, the state also enacted, at the
same time, an Unconsolidated Law that provides certain
retroactive relief to defendant homeowners. Section 3-a of the
enacted bill87 provides that, for residential foreclosure actions
commenced before September 1, 2008, courts must ask the
plaintiff whether the loan at issue falls within the scope of the
new statute, and, if it does, the court must then notify the
defendant of the right to demand a settlement conference.88
Curiously, the language of Section 3-a expressly applies to
subprime and high-cost home loans as defined by RPAPL 1304
and Banking Law 6-l, but does not expressly apply to
nontraditional home loans, unlike CPLR 3408.89 A settlement
conference under Section 3-a is not a mandated right. Section
3-a further provides that, to be eligible for a settlement
conference, the defendant must reside at the property subject
to foreclosure and the action must not yet have proceeded to
judgment.90

85. See, e.g., Simonson v. Int’l Bank, 200 N.E.2d 427, 431-32 (N.Y. 1964);
Jacobus v. Colgate, 111 N.E. 837, 838-39 (N.Y. 1916); State ex rel. Spitzer v.
Daicel Chem. Indus., 840 N.Y.S.2d 8, 11 (App. Div. 2007); Mealing v. Hills,
517 N.Y.S.2d 321, 322 (App. Div. 1987); Cady v. County of Broome, 451
N.Y.S.2d 206 (App. Div. 1982); Linda I.V. v. Gil R.C., 673 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Fam.
Ct. 1998); Ponterio v. Regan, 521 N.Y.S.2d 965, 966-67 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
86. See N.Y. STAT. LAW § 55 (McKinney 2009); Simonson v. Int’l Bank,
200 N.E.2d 427, 431-32 (N.Y. 1964); Chapman v. State, 690 N.Y.S.2d 328,
328 (App. Div. 1999); Wade v. Byung Yang Kim, 681 N.Y.S.2d 355, 357 (App.
Div. 1998); Auger v. State, 666 N.Y.S.2d 760 (App. Div. 1997).
87. 2008 N.Y. Laws ch. 472, § 3-a.
88. Id.; LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Novetti, 889 N.Y.S.2d 506, No. 653508, 2009 WL 1810511, at *1 (Sup. Ct. June 15, 2009) (unreported disposition);
Siegel, supra note 13.
89. 2008 N.Y. Laws ch. 472, § 3-a.
90. Id. See also LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 2009 WL 1810511, at *1.
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Telephonic and Video-Conferencing

The last sentence of CPLR 3408 refers to a telephonic and
video-conference option.91
Participation in a foreclosure
settlement conference by electronic means is a matter left to
the discretion of the court.92 Video-conferencing, whatever its
merits given current technology, is not a concept that is
otherwise recognized in either the CPLR or in the Uniform
Rules for the New York State Trial Courts.93 Notably, the
option under CPLR 3408 is expressly limited to ―a
representative of the plaintiff to attend the settlement
conference telephonically or by video-conference.‖94
The
electronic option is not extended, by the wording of the statute,
to defendants or their attorneys.
The statute’s provision that a ―representative of the
plaintiff‖ may be permitted to electronically participate in the
conference does not appear to refer to the plaintiff’s attorney.
CPLR 3408 refers frequently to ―the plaintiff,‖ ―the defendant,‖
―parties,‖ and ―counsel.‖ The term ―representative of the
91. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408(c).
92. Specifically, CPLR 3408(c) provides that ―[w]here appropriate, the
court may‖ allow telephonic or video participation, which is language of
discretion. Id. (emphasis added). See N.Y. STAT. LAW § 177(a) cmt.
93. At most, section 202.15 of the Uniform Rules for the New York State
Trial Courts provides for audio-visual recording of witness depositions,
pursuant to specific procedures set forth in the rule. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 22, § 202.15 (2010). See also Duncan v. 605 3rd Ave., LLC, 853
N.Y.S.2d 592 (App. Div. 2008); R.M. v. Dr. R., 59 N.Y.S.2d 906, No. 50364(U),
2008 WL 509092 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 26, 2008) (unreported disposition); In re
Sawyer, 823 N.Y.S.2d 641, 645 (Sup. Ct. 2006); Parker v. Parker, 773
N.Y.S.2d 518, 523 (Sup. Ct. 2003); Fajardo v. St. Joseph’s Med. Ctr., 746
N.Y.S.2d 779, 780 (Sup. Ct. 2002); Roche v. Udell, 588 N.Y.S.2d 76, 79-81
(Sup. Ct. 1992); Velasquez v. Columbia Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 522 N.Y.S.2d
416, 418 (Sup. Ct. 1987). Nevertheless, video-conference technology has also
been utilized for witnesses at certain hearings and trials. See, e.g., Dates v.
Mundt, 771 N.Y.S.2d 740 (App. Div. 2004); Perez v. Hynes, 880 N.Y.S.2d 875,
No. 50196(U), 2009 WL 305520 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 04, 2009) (unreported
disposition); State v. Pedraza, 853 N.Y.S.2d 476, 478 (Sup. Ct. 2007); People
v. Chase, 803 N.Y.S.2d 20, No. 51125(U), 2005 WL 1692330 (N.Y. County Ct.
May 19, 2005) (unreported disposition), but in criminal trials the concept
appears to conflict with the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment. See United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307,
1314 (11th Cir. 2006); People v. Wrotten, 871 N.Y.S.2d 28, 37 (App. Div.
2008).
94. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408(c) (emphasis added).
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plaintiff‖ appears only one time in the statute, when referring
to the electronic participation option. The Legislature’s use of
the term ―representative‖ rather than ―counsel‖ suggests that
the individual who may participate in the conference
electronically is someone other than the plaintiff’s attorney;
otherwise, the Legislature could have simply referred to the
individual as the plaintiff’s counsel, as it did elsewhere. The
Bill Jacket for CPLR 3408 sheds no particular light on the
identity of this ―representative.‖ However, the term likely
refers to a representative of the bank or mortgage company,
such as a corporate officer, litigation manager, or accountant
involved in settlement-related decision-making or the
computation of proposed compromised payment schedules.
It remains to be seen how frequently the statute’s
electronic participation option will be used. On the one hand,
loan specialists’ participation in settlement conferences from
remote locations may recognize a manpower reality: that the
volume of mortgage foreclosure conferences necessitates this
accommodation to party plaintiffs. On the other hand, courts
might find that settlements are less likely to be achieved
absent the face-to-face participation of all individuals necessary
to the successful resolution of a foreclosure action.
II. The Expansion of CPLR 3408 Effective December 15, 2009
The ink was dry on the original version of CPLR 3408 for
less than a year before bills were introduced in the New York
State Legislature to expand its scope. The bills that emerged
from the State’s Senate and Assembly, S66007 and A40007,
mandated the conduct of settlement conferences in all
residential mortgage foreclosure actions, not just those
involving subprime, non-traditional, or high-cost mortgages.95
The expanded legislation was signed into law by Governor
David Paterson on December 15, 2009.96
95. New York State Senate, S66007: Relates to home mortgage loans,
the crime of mortgage fraud, and appropriations to the NYS housing trust
fund corporation, http://open.nysenate.gov/openleg/api/1.0/html/bill/S66007
(last visited Feb. 15, 2010); New York State Assembly, Summary – A40007,
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A40007 (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).
96. 2009 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 507, § 9 (McKinney); Press Release,
Governor David A. Paterson, Governor Paterson Signs Comprehensive
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The amendment of CPLR 3408 adds, inter alia,
subdivisions (d) through (h) to the statute.97 The amended
statute keeps intact all aspects of the original version of the
statute, except for the application of its terms in subdivision (a)
to all ―home loans.‖98 The meaning of ―home loans‖ is set forth
in RPAPL 1304, and includes all loans for one- to four-family
dwellings secured by a mortgage or deed of trust. The
amended statute therefore abolishes the need for qualifying
residential mortgage foreclosure defendants to be parties to
subprime, non-traditional or high-cost loans. Inferentially, the
expanded statute recognizes a current economic reality that the
foreclosure problem in New York extends beyond subprime,
non-traditional and high-cost residential mortgages, to
conventional residential mortgages as well.
Predictably, the 2009 amendments to CPLR 3408 will
place an immediate added burden on the court system, which
shall now be required to conduct a significantly increased
number of foreclosure settlement conferences without any
earmarked funding to meet the need.99 The New York State
Office of Court Administration estimates that the new
statewide foreclosure filings for 2009 will approximate
46,000,100 which suggests the magnitude of the challenge facing
the conferencing courts in 2010 and beyond.
The expansion of CPLR 3408 to all residential home loans
is subject to an intriguing ―sunset‖ provision. It provides that
the expansion of the statute to all ―home loans‖ be effective for
only five years from the effective date of the 2009 version of
CPLR 3408(a), at which time the statute reverts to its original
2008 form that limits the mandatory foreclosure settlement
conferences to subprime, non-traditional, and high-cost
residential mortgages.101 Inferentially, the presence of a sunset
provision suggests legislative optimism that the current
residential mortgage foreclosure difficulties will lessen with
Foreclosure Legislation into Law (Dec. 15, 2009), available at
http://www.state.ny.us/governor/press/press_12150901.html.
97. 2009 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 507, § 9(d) – (h) (McKinney).
98. Id. § 9(a).
99. Vesselin Mitey, Strained Courts Brace for Influx of Foreclosure
Conferences Under Law That Broadens Eligibility, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 18, 2009,
at 1.
100. Id.
101. 2009 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 507, § 25(e) (McKinney).
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time.
CPLR 3408(f), as now enacted, requires that plaintiffs and
defendants negotiate with each other in good faith during their
mandated settlement conferences.102 The statutory purpose of
the settlement conferences will not be achieved absent the good
faith of the parties involved. CPLR 3408(f) does not set forth
any specific remedy for a party’s failure to negotiate in good
faith. However, in one reported decision dealing with this
subject prior to the effective date of the amended statute, a
court held that the failure of the plaintiff bank to negotiate in
good faith during the mandated conference warranted, as a
remedy under the circumstances of that action, the cancellation
The court cancelled the
of the mortgage altogether.103
mortgage by asserting equitable powers, in response to the
plaintiff bank’s ―inequitable, unconscionable, vexatious and
opprobrious‖ behavior.104 Professor Siegel hints that the
drastic remedy that was imposed may reach an appellate court
for review.105
CPLR 3408(g), as now enacted, requires plaintiffs in
residential foreclosure actions to file notices of discontinuances
and to vacate lis pendens within 150 days from the execution of
any settlement agreement or loan modification.106
CPLR 3408(h), as now enacted, prohibits any party to a
foreclosure action from charging the other party legal fees
incurred in connection with the settlement conference itself.107
This amendment appears to be directed at provisions of
mortgages that impose legal fees upon mortgagors for various
costs associated with defaults and the enforcement of
mortgagees’ rights.

102. Id. § 9(f).
103. IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Yano-Horoski, 890 N.Y.S.2d 313, 319-20
(Sup. Ct. 2009).
104. Id. at 319.
105. David D. Siegel, Invoking Equitable Powers, Court Cancels
Mortgage and Note of Foreclosing Plaintiff for “Duplicity” and “Opprobrious
Demeanor” in Failing to Cooperate at Conference, SIEGEL’S PRAC. REV., Dec.
2009, at 1, available at 216 SIEGELPR 1 (WestLaw).
106. 2009 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 507, § 9(g) (McKinney).
107. Id. § 9(h).
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III. Perceived Pitfalls of CPLR 3408
While CPLR 3408 is a welcome addition to the family of
New York’s procedural statutes, one that performs a
worthwhile social purpose, the statute’s construction and
wording raises certain discrete shortcomings.
These
shortcomings involve inconsistencies regarding how the sixtyday conference requirement is to be measured, the effect of
proofs of service filed in connection with default motions, and
the absence of mechanisms that might render the settlement
conferences more productive.
A. Measurement of the Sixty-Day Conference Requirement
CPLR 3408(a) provides a time frame within which the
settlement conference mandated by the statute is to be held. It
provides that the conference be conducted ―within sixty days
after the date when proof of service is filed with the county
clerk, or on such adjourned date as has been agreed to by the
parties . . .‖108 The statute’s measurement of the conference
period—from the filing of proof of service with the clerk of the
court—is an oddity, and it is unwise because, while certain
methods of service of process in New York require the filing of
proof of service, other methods do not.
More specifically, CPLR 308(2) permits service of process
to be accomplished at a defendant’s ―actual place of business,
dwelling place, or usual place of abode‖ by delivery of the
summons to a person of suitable age and discretion, followed
within twenty days by either a mailing to the defendant at his
or her last known residence, or a first-class mailing to the
defendant at his or her actual place of business in an
unmarked envelope marked ―personal and confidential.‖109
108. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408(a) (McKinney 2009).
109. Id. 308(2). See generally, Charnin v. Cogan, 673 N.Y.S.2d 134, 13536 (App. Div. 1998); Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Venticinque, 658
N.Y.S.2d 689 (App. Div. 1997); Melton v. Brotman Foot Care Group, 604
N.Y.S.2d 203 (App. Div. 1993); Donohue v. Schwartz, 570 N.Y.S.2d 542 (App.
Div. 1991); Borges v. Entra Am., Inc., 801 N.Y.S.2d 230, No. 50845(U), 2005
WL 1355144, at *2 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. May 9, 2005) (unreported disposition);
Star Brite Painting, Inc. v. Dubie’s Hot Spot Inc., 784 N.Y.S.2d 924, No.
50136(U), 2004 WL 503488, at *2 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. Mar. 1, 2004)
(unreported disposition).
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When the ―suitable age and discretion‖ method is used, the
plaintiff is required to file proof of service with the clerk of the
court within twenty days from the latter of such delivery or
mailing, and service is deemed to be complete ten days after
the filing.110
Likewise, if service cannot be accomplished with due
diligence by either personal service or upon a person of suitable
age and discretion, the plaintiff may utilize the colloquiallyknown ―nail and mail‖ method set forth in CPLR 308(4), which
also has a proof of service requirement.111 This method
requires that the summons be affixed to the door of the
defendant’s actual place of business, dwelling place, or usual
place of abode, followed by a mailing to the defendant at his or
her last known residence, or by a first-class mailing to the
defendant’s actual place of business in an unmarked envelope
marked ―personal and confidential.‖112 Like service under
CPLR 308(2), the ―nail and mail‖ method requires the filing of
proof of service with the clerk of the court within twenty days
of either the affixing or mailing, whichever is later, and service
is deemed complete ten days after such filing.113
However, many actions are commenced in New York by
110. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(2). See generally Weininger v. Sassower, 612
N.Y.S.2d 249 (App. Div. 1994); Bartlett v. Gage, 633 N.Y.S.2d 246, 248 (Sup.
Ct. 1995). The failure of a party to file a timely proof of claim is not a
jurisdictional defect, but is instead a mere irregularity that is curable by
motion to the court. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2004; Zareef v. Lin Wong, 877
N.Y.S.2d 182 (App. Div. 2009); County of Nassau v. Gallagher, 828 N.Y.S.2d
445 (App. Div. 2006); Penachio v. Penachio, 812 N.Y.S.2d 592, 594 (App. Div.
2006); Koslowski v. Koslowski, 672 N.Y.S.2d 808 (App. Div. 1998);
Hausknecht v. Ackerman, 662 N.Y.S.2d 567, 569-70 (App. Div. 1997); Bank of
N.Y. v. Schwab, 467 N.Y.S.2d 415 (App. Div. 1983); Marazita v. Nelbach, 456
N.Y.S.2d 423 (App. Div. 1982).
111. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(4).
112. Id. See generally Feinstein v. Bergner, 48 N.Y.2d 234, 239 (1979);
Comm’rs of State Ins. Fund v. Khondoker, 865 N.Y.S.2d 287, 288 (App. Div.
2008); Gantman v. Cohen, 618 N.Y.S.2d 100, 100-01 (App. Div. 1994);
Schwartzman v. Musso, 607 N.Y.S.2d 953 (App. Div. 1994); Woods v. Balick,
603 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. Div. 1993); Serrano v. Pape, 591 N.Y.S.2d 516 (App.
Div. 1992); Magalios v. Benjamin, 554 N.Y.S.2d 61, 61 (App. Div. 1990);
Tymkin v. Edwards, 551 N.Y.S.2d 126 (App. Div. 1990); Citibank, N.A. v.
Keller, 518 N.Y.S.2d 409, 410 (App. Div. 1987); Ladell v. Field, 495 N.Y.S.2d
449, 450 (App. Div. 1985); Agin v. Krest Assocs., 599 N.Y.S.2d 367, 369 n.2
(Sup. Ct. 1992).
113. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(4). See generally Rosato v. Ricciardi, 571
N.Y.S.2d 633 (App. Div. 1991).
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means of personal service upon individual defendants as
authorized by CPLR 308(1)114 and by service upon a properlydesignated agent as authorized by CPLR 308(3).115 Neither of
these methods require, in CPLR 308 or elsewhere, that the
plaintiff file any proof of service with the court.116
Accordingly, in residential foreclosure actions where
process is served upon the defendant and where proof of service
need not be filed with the clerk of the court, CPLR 3408
contains no statutory trigger date for the scheduling of the
mandatory settlement conference. Conceivably, in the absence
of a statutory trigger mechanism, the settlement conference
need not necessarily be scheduled at all.
This flaw in
legislative draftsmanship was probably not intended by the
New York Legislature, as it potentially thwarts the purpose
and intent of CPLR 3408 in instances where defendants in
residential foreclosure actions are served personally or through
a designated agent.
This flawed draftsmanship could have been avoided. In
matrimonial actions, Uniform Rule 202.16(f) provides for an
analogous requirement that a preliminary conference be held
between the parties and the court ―within 45 days after the
action has been assigned.‖117 The assignment of an action to a
judge, by means of a Request for Judicial Intervention (―RJI‖),
must occur in matrimonial actions within forty-five days from
114. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(1). See generally Espy v. Giorlando, 436 N.E.2d
193 (N.Y. 1982); McGreevy v. Simon, 633 N.Y.S.2d 177, 178 (App. Div. 1995);
Coyne v. Besser, 546 N.Y.S.2d 129 (App. Div. 1989); Velez v. Smith, 540
N.Y.S.2d 339 (App. Div. 1989); Jones v. Nossoughi, 537 N.Y.S.2d 565 (App.
Div. 1989); Prof’l Billing Res., Inc. v. Haddad, 705 N.Y.S.2d 204, 207 (N.Y.
City Civ. Ct. 2000); Bertha G. v. Paul T., 509 N.Y.S.2d 995, 996-97 (Fam. Ct.
1986).
115. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(3). See generally Jackson v. County of Nassau,
339 F. Supp. 2d 473, 477 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); Espy, 436 N.E.2d at 193;
Donaldson v. Melville, 507 N.Y.S.2d 301, 302 (App. Div. 1986); Hall v.
Bickweat, 584 N.Y.S.2d 690 (App. Div. 1992); In re Estate of Gottesman, 511
N.Y.S.2d 643, 644, (App. Div. 1989).
116. Compare N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(1) & (3) with N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(2) & (4).
117. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.16(f) (2004). Uniform
Rule 202.12(b), which applies to other civil actions, has a similar forty-five
day requirement for the scheduling of preliminary conferences measured
from the purchase and filing of a Request for Judicial Intervention (―RJI‖).
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.12(b) (2009). In non-matrimonial
actions, however, there is no deadline for the filing of an RJI. N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.6(a) (2000).
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the date of service upon the defendant of the summons with
notice or summons and complaint.118
The mandatory
preliminary conference for matrimonial actions under Uniform
Rule 202.16(f), therefore, in effect, establishes an outside date
within which preliminary conferences must be conducted by
the court. The purpose of Uniform Rule 202.16(f) is to assure
that matrimonial actions, which often raise difficult and
important issues such as child custody, visitation, pendente lite
child support and maintenance, and the ultimate equitable
distribution of marital assets, receive reasonably prompt
attention from the courts.119 Prompt preliminary conferences
ensure that parties have an opportunity, early in their
litigations, to stipulate to non-contested issues and to obtain
court-ordered discovery schedules that shepherd the progress
of the litigations. The scheduling of preliminary conferences in
matrimonial actions, triggered by the filing of a deadlined RJI,
is implemented in courts throughout the state without
apparent problems or difficulties. Similarly, in actions for
medical, dental and podiatric malpractice, CPLR 3406(a)
requires the filing of a notice with the court within sixty days
from the joinder of issue.120 The purpose of the notice is to
trigger an early conference with the court to discuss
settlement, simplify issues, and schedule discovery.121 There is
no reason that the New York Legislature, in enacting CPLR
3408, could not also have required that settlement conferences
be scheduled within a certain time period after a fixed date
applicable to all foreclosure actions, such as from the filing of
the plaintiff’s summons and complaint or the joinder of issue.
118. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.16(d) (2004). The RJI
must be purchased for a fee of $95.00. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8020(a). CPLR 306-b
requires that absent a court-approved extension, process must be made upon
the defendant within 120 days from the filing of the plaintiff’s summons with
notice or summons and complaint. Leader v. Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 97
N.Y.2d 95, 100-01 (2001). If a matrimonial plaintiff takes the full 120 days
for service, followed by the full forty-five days for purchasing an RJI, and if
the court conducts a preliminary conference forty-five days thereafter, the
time frame for conducting the initial matrimonial conference is capped at 210
days from the action’s commencement. As a practical matter, preliminary
conferences in matrimonial actions are conducted well in advance of the
mathematical calendar maximum.
119. Cf. Qi v. Ng, 632 N.Y.S.2d 757, 757 (Sup. Ct. 1995).
120. See also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.56(a)(1), (b);
Sturleti v. Stigliano, 511 N.Y.S.2d 770, 770 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
121. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3406(a).
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Instead, by measuring the scheduling period from the filing of
proof of service, which may not even occur in certain cases,
CPLR 3408 introduces an element of statutory uncertainty and
potential confusion that could have been easily avoided.
This defect in legislative draftsmanship is partially
mitigated by the Chief Administrative Judge’s promulgation of
Uniform Rule 202.12a122 for residential mortgage foreclosure
actions commenced on or after September 1, 2008.123 Uniform
Rule 202.12a applies to subprime, non-traditional, and highcost home loans, as defined by RPAPL 1304 and Banking Law
6-l, entered into between January 1, 2003 and September 1,
2008. Thus, the rule is similar in scope to the Subprime
Residential Loan and Foreclosure Laws of 2008 including,
specifically, CPLR 3408.124 Uniform Rule 202.12a requires that
foreclosure plaintiffs covered by the rule file a specialized RJI
―[a]t the time that proof of service of the summons and
complaint is filed with the county clerk.‖125 Uniform Rule
202.12a implements the procedure by which the mandatory
settlement conferences are then scheduled, noticed, and
conducted, in a manner consistent with and in furtherance of
CPLR 3408.126
The one problem with Uniform Rule 202.12a, however, is
that the specialized foreclosure RJI need not be filed by the
plaintiff until the filing of the plaintiff’s proof of service and, as
noted, the filing of proof of service is not always required.127
The reason that Uniform Rule 202.12a mitigates the problem is
that plaintiffs cannot seek or obtain relief from the courts, such
as by the filing of motions for summary judgment, except by
first filing their RJIs. In the end, therefore, the Uniform Rule
will accomplish its practical purpose of triggering the
mandated settlement conference in all covered actions, either
sooner or later in each covered action. Uniform Rule 202.12a is
122. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.12a (2008).
123. Id. § 202.12a(a).
124. The one noticeable difference between CPLR 3408 and Uniform
Rule 202.12a is that the statute applies to covered actions commenced as of
its effective date, August 5, 2008, whereas the Uniform Rule applies to
covered actions commenced as of September 1, 2008. The chronological
difference is marginal.
125. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.12a(b).
126. Compare id. § 202.12a(c) with N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408.
127. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(1), (3).
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not as effective as its matrimonial counterpart, Uniform Rule
202.16(d), as the mortgage foreclosure rule places no fixed
outside time limit on when the plaintiff’s RJI must be filed in
all cases, whereas the matrimonial rule requires the filing of
an RJI within forty-five days from the service of the summons
upon the defendant in every case.128 In other words, Uniform
Rule 202.16(d) will prove to be more effective in assuring the
scheduling of prompt preliminary conferences for all
matrimonial litigants than Uniform Rule 202.12a will be in
assuring prompt settlement conferences for covered residential
foreclosure litigants. The delay in scheduling and conducting
settlement conferences in certain covered foreclosure actions
will occur in circumstances when plaintiffs are under no
statutory obligation to file proofs of service under CPLR 308(1)
and 308(3), and where no RJIs are filed until such times that
plaintiffs are motivated to seek some form of affirmative relief
from the courts.
Plaintiffs who might wish to avoid participation in
conferences, calculating that their financial interests are
furthered by foreclosures rather than settlements, can take no
solace from the draftsmanship of CPLR 3408 or Uniform Rule
202.12a. At first blush, the wording of CPLR 3408 and
Uniform Rule 202.12-a might provide such foreclosure
plaintiffs with an incentive to serve process upon residential
defendants only by methods that do not require the filing of
proofs of service with the court, as a calculated means of
circumventing the trigger event of the settlement conferences
altogether. However, if such plaintiffs desire judgments of
foreclosure and auctions of the foreclosed properties, as they
ultimately do in commencing their actions, they must all
eventually file RJIs. In turn, these filings will trigger the very
mandated settlement conferences that the plaintiffs were
trying to avoid.
Judges can further the letter and spirit of CPLR 3408 by
assuring that if the RJI is filed by plaintiffs in conjunction with
motions for affirmative relief, such as for summary judgment,
the motions should be held in abeyance pending the completion
of the mandated settlement conference. Such a rule would be

128. Compare N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.12a(c) with
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.16(d).
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consistent with the discretion that is afforded to trial judges to
control their calendars.129 Courts should not permit foreclosure
plaintiffs to use summary judgment motions to circumvent the
settlement conference procedures of CPLR 3408.
B. Whether Proof of Service Filed in Support of a Default
Motion Triggers A Mandatory Settlement Conference Under
the Statute
As noted, when service of process is accomplished by either
personal service or upon a designated agent, the CPLR does not
impose upon plaintiffs any obligation to file proof of service
with the clerks of the courts.130 As also noted, the procedures
of CPLR 3408 are written so that the statute’s mandatory
settlement conference is not triggered until the filing of proofs
of service,131 though courts have authority to schedule such
conferences in any event.
If proof of service need not be filed with the clerk of the
court, and if a defendant defaults by failing to appear in the
action or answer the plaintiff’s complaint, the remedy that is
routinely undertaken by foreclosure plaintiffs is to file a motion
seeking judgment on default.132 One of the elements that must
be proven in support of default judgments is proof of service of
process upon the defendant.133 Indeed, CPLR 3215(f) requires
that all motions for default judgments contain evidence134
proving that service of process has, in fact, been effected upon
the defendant.135 An issue that arises from such default
129. See, e.g., Schreiber-Cross v. State, 870 N.Y.S.2d 438, 442 (App. Div.
2008).
130. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 308(1), (3).
131. Id. 3408(a).
132. See id. 3215(a).
133. See, e.g., Oparaji v. Duran, 795 N.Y.S.2d 341 (App. Div. 2005).
Accord N.Y. Mut. Underwriters v. Baumgartner, 797 N.Y.S.2d 210, 214 (App.
Div. 2005); Ocuto Blacktop & Paving Co. v. Trataros Constr., 715 N.Y.S.2d
565 (App. Div. 2000); Green v. Dolphy Constr. Co., 590 N.Y.S.2d 238, 239
(App. Div. 1992).
134. The evidence typically contained in the moving papers is an
affidavit of service.
Conceivably, it could also include a written
acknowledgment of service by the person served.
135. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3215(f). See generally Mullins v. DiLorenzo, 606
N.Y.S.2d 161 (App. Div. 1993); Shapiro v. Rose, 600 N.Y.S.2d 819 (App. Div.
1993); Ice Sculpture Designs, Inc. v. Icebreakers, 836 N.Y.S.2d 493, No.
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motions, unique to foreclosure actions subject to CPLR 3408, is
whether the inclusion of proof of service in the supporting
papers constitutes a ―filing of proof of service‖ with the clerk so
as to trigger, under these circumstances, the mandatory
settlement conference.
As of this writing, no reported decision has been rendered
by any court that addresses this issue. There does not appear
to be any persuasive reason on the face of the statute why proof
of service contained in a default motion would not qualify as a
filing of proof of service for purposes of CPLR 3408. While it is
true that a defendant who is truly in default might not appear
at any settlement conference that the court would schedule,
CPLR 3408 is not designed to compel such an appearance;
rather, it merely requires that these conferences be scheduled
so that defendants have the opportunity to appear and
participate in them. Apropos to the statute is the maxim that
―you can lead a horse to water but you can’t make him drink.‖
The court’s obligation under CPLR 3408(a) is to schedule the
contemplated settlement conference, and to conduct the
conference when the parties appear for it. Doing so fulfills the
court’s statutory obligations whether the defendant appears or
defaults.
If, arguendo, evidence of proof of service attached to a
default motion doubles as a ―filing‖ of proof of service with the
clerk of the court so as to mandate the scheduling of a
settlement conference, then, necessarily, courts should hold
such default motions in abeyance pending the scheduling of a
conference at which the defendant may, or may not, appear.
CPLR 3408 sets forth no minimum notice period; it only
imposes a sixty-day maximum deadline measured from the
filing of proof of service. Notice of a scheduled settlement
conference while a default motion is held in abeyance, as with
notice of all conferences generally, should be reasonable and
transmitted by the court to an address calculated to advise the
50194(U), 2007 WL340293, at *2 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 5, 2007) (unreported
disposition); Tucker Family Trust v. Taylor, 836 N.Y.S.2d 490, No. 50087(U),
2007 WL 137112 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 2007) (unreported disposition); Einheber
v. Bodenheimer, 820 N.Y.S.2d 842, No. 51264(U), 2006 WL 1835019, at *3
(Sup. Ct. May, 5, 2006) (unreported disposition); Adkins v. Lipner, Gordon &
Co., 814 N.Y.S.2d 559, No. 52073(U), 2005 WL 3487789, at *3 (Sup. Ct. Dec.
20, 2005) (unreported disposition); Jann v. Cassidy, 696 N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sup.
Ct. 1999); Matthew v. Mosier, 832 N.Y.S.2d 408 (City Ct. 2007).
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defendant of the date, time, and place of the conference. Any
delays occasioned by the conference procedure to the prompt
disposition of pending default motions would be expected in
most instances to be reasonable and minor and would be
outweighed by the intended benefit to the parties of potentially
settling foreclosure actions in a restructured manner that may
keep families in their homes.
C. Does the Absence of a Conference Warrant the Vacatur of a
Default Judgment?
Conceivably, a court could, through ministerial error, fail
to schedule a settlement conference as mandated by CPLR
3408. In such a scenario, if a borrower does not appear and
answer in a foreclosure action and a judgment of foreclosure is
rendered on default, may the borrower obtain a vacatur of the
judgment on the ground that the settlement conference
opportunity was not provided? The short answer is no.
In New York, defendants who seek to vacate default
judgments are generally required under CPLR 5015 to meet a
two-pronged test, the first being a reasonable excuse for the
default,136 and the second being the existence of a meritorious
claim or defense.137
136. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5015(a)(1). E.g., Jones v. 414 Equities LLC, 866
N.Y.S.2d 165, 178 (App. Div. 2008); Apple Bank for Sav. v. Fort Tyron
Apartments Corp., 843 N.Y.S.2d 307 (App. Div. 2007); State v. Williams, 843
N.Y.S.2d 722, 724 (App. Div. 2007); Knupfer v. Hertz Corp., 827 N.Y.S.2d
394,394 (App. Div. 2006); Nilt, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 826
N.Y.S.2d 471 (App. Div 2006); Wilson v. Sherman Terrace Co-op, Inc., 787
N.Y.S.2d 318 (App. Div. 2005); Heskel’s West 38th St. Corp. v. Gotham
Constr. Co., 787 N.Y.S.2d 285 (App. Div. 2005); Smolinski v. Smolinski, 786
N.Y.S.2d 881 (App. Div. 2004); Taylor v. Saal, 771 N.Y.S.2d 671 (App. Div.
2004); Dominguez v. Carioscia, 766 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686 (App. Div. 2003);
Sanford v. 27-29 W. 181st St. Ass’n, 753 N.Y.S.2d 49 (App. Div. 2002).
137. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5015(a)(2). See, e.g., Maines Paper & Food Serv., Inc.
v. Boulevard Burgers Corp., 861 N.Y.S.2d 808, 810 (App. Div. 2008); Fladell
v. Am. Red Magen David for Israel, 844 N.Y.S.2d 136 (App. Div. 2007);
Vargas v. Ahmed, 837 N.Y.S.2d 654 (App. Div. 2007); ORT Assocs. v.
Mouzouris, 836 N.Y.S.2d 62 (App. Div. 2007); Bollino v. Hitzig, 825 N.Y.S.2d
511 (App. Div. 2006); Rubenbauer v. Mekelburg, 803 N.Y.S.2d 183 (App. Div.
2005); Alaska Seaboard Partners v. Grant, 799 N.Y.S.2d 117 (App. Div.
2005); Compass Group, USA, Inc. v. Mazula, 795 N.Y.S.2d 395 (App. Div.
2005); Dodge v. Commander, 794 N.Y.S.2d 482 (App. Div. 2005); Wilson v.
Sherman Terrace Co-op, Inc., 787 N.Y.S.2d 318 (App. Div. 2005); Merrill/N.Y.
Co. v. Celerity Sys., Inc., 752 N.Y.S.2d 301 (App. Div. 2002); Barton v.
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The failure of a court to schedule a settlement conference
required by CPLR 3408 does not speak to the reasons
underlying the defendant’s failure to appear in an action and
answer the plaintiff’s complaint. Indeed, a defendant’s failure
to appear and answer after being served with process, and the
failure to participate in a settlement conference with the court,
are two very different things. A defendant seeking to vacate a
default must establish a reasonable excuse for failing to appear
and answer, which speaks to procedural obligations under the
CPLR that are wholly independent of mandatory foreclosure
settlement conferences.
In any event, even if a defendant in a foreclosure action
establishes a reasonable excuse for failing to appear that
somehow relates to the court’s failure to schedule a settlement
conference, the absence of the conference says nothing of the
meritorious defense that must also be established for vacatur of
the default. Defenses, meritorious or otherwise, may be
discussed at settlement conferences. However, the absence of a
conference itself is irrelevant to whether the defendant
independently possesses a meritorious defense to a foreclosure
action.
Accordingly, it is unlikely that the inadvertent failure of a
court to offer a settlement conference under CPLR 3408 affords
a defaulted defendant any practical relief. In the event that
future defendants seek to vacate default judgments on the
ground that they were not provided their mandatory
settlement conference opportunity under the statute, it is
predicted here that the vacatur of default judgments will be
denied, unless such defendants can establish an entitlement to
vacatur on other independent grounds.
D. Whether the Settlement Conferences are Meaningful and
Successful
In its proper context, CPLR 3408 is, for defendants,
actually a second bite at the settlement apple. One of the
provisions of the Subprime Residential Loan and Foreclosure
Laws of 2008 is RPAPL 1304, which provides that, as a
condition precedent to the commencement of a residential
Executive Health Exam’rs, 716 N.Y.S.2d 3 (App. Div. 2000).
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foreclosure action involving subprime, nontraditional, or highcost mortgages, the lender must send the borrower a default
notice, at least ninety days before the commencement of the
action.138 Such notices must advise the borrower that he or she
is in danger of losing the home for non-payment, state the sum
owed to cure the default, and list approved mortgage
counseling agencies that are available in the area.139 The
obvious purpose of encouraging borrowers to consult with
mortgage counseling services is for those service providers to
assist in exploring potential re-finance options that seek to
avoid the necessity of foreclosure actions. Foreclosure actions
are commenced only against borrowers who fail to cure their
defaults within the ninety-day notice period, with or without
the assistance of a mortgage counselor. The mandatory
settlement conference contemplated by CPLR 3408 is,
therefore, the second settlement opportunity provided to
borrowers by the Subprime Residential Loan and Foreclosure
Laws. Any settlement that is reached at the conference should
be memorialized in a clear, enforceable, written or transcribed
agreement.140
A perceived pitfall of CPLR 3408 is that, while the statute
mandates a settlement conference in residential foreclosure
actions, there is no mechanism, beyond the conference itself,
assuring that any meaningful accomplishments will arise from
the effort. As noted, by the time of the conference, earlier
settlement opportunities have, by definition, already failed. It
cannot be reasonably expected that all or even most of the
conferences will lead to a resolution of foreclosure litigations.
However, CPLR 3408 provides that any counsel appearing for
the mandatory settlement conference ―shall be fully authorized
to dispose of the case,‖141 likely written to help assure the
138. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1304(1). The notice is to be sent by
the lender via registered or certified mail.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1304(2).
Compliance with this and other laws must be affirmatively pleaded in the
plaintiff’s complaint. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1302(1).
139. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1304(1). When foreclosure actions are
commenced, further warnings and advice must be provided to the borrower
with the summons and complaint, as set forth in RPAPL 1303. See
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Taylor, 843 N.Y.S.2d 495, 498 (Sup. Ct.
2007) (regarding a predecessor version of CPLR 1303).
140. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2104. Accord Bruce J. Bergman, Entertainment of
Settlement Could Backfire on Lender, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 31, 2008, at 5.
141. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408(c).
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seriousness and desired productivity of the conferences. The
recent amendments to CPLR 3408 include the statute’s new
subdivision (f) that requires parties to negotiate in good faith at
the settlement conferences,142 which may be of marginal
practical solace.
Without doubt, the required residential
foreclosure settlement conferences add to the workload of an
already-overburdened judiciary. Each judge throughout the
state may handle the conferences differently: either in
chambers or in open court, on motion days or in special session,
personally or through a law secretary, with or without
meaningful negotiation.143 The value of the conference will
depend in any given instance upon a variety of factors
including the facts of the case, the goals and reasonableness of
the parties, and the negotiating experience and quality of the
assigned judge and counsel.
While the New York State Office of Court Administration
(―OCA‖) does not compile statewide foreclosure settlement
conference statistics, it does capture statistical information for
the larger counties in the greater New York City area.144
Statistics for the period between approximately January 1,
2009 and September 30, 2009145 reveal the following:146

142. 2009 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 507, § 9(f) (McKinney).
143. See Tolchinsky & Wertheim, supra note 13, at 3.
144. E-mail from Paul Lewis, Esq., Office of Court Administration, to
author (Oct. 20, 2009).
145. According to the OCA, different counties began keeping records and
implementing procedures at different times, and the sixty-day conference
period meant that the earliest conferences were not conducted until
approximately January of 2009.
146. The statistics for Queens, Kings, Richmond, Bronx, Nassau, and
Suffolk Counties were provided by the OCA via e-mail on October 20, 2009.
The statistics for Westchester County were separately provided via e-mail by
Nancy Barry, Esq., dated October 26, 2009.
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1,871
1852
476
1173
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1075
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622
861
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Defaults in
Appearance
768
552
181
411
1231
1559
214

Settlements
Reached
83
82
47
109
101
84
46

The statistics establish that for the settlement conferences
that were scheduled, defendants failed to appear at scheduled
settlement conferences between 19.9% (Westchester County)
and 47% (Nassau County) of the time, with one aberrational
exception where the default rate was 71.5% (Suffolk County).
The mandatory settlement conference concept, therefore,
provides no practical benefit to a significant portion of
residential foreclosure cases, where the defendants fail to
appear and participate.
The statistics also establish that, for the conferences
attended by the parties, the settlement rate was 16% in
Richmond County, 14% in Bronx County, 13.5% in Suffolk
County, 7.5% in Queens County, 7.3% in Nassau County, 6.3%
in Kings County, and 5.3% in Westchester County. When
defaults are taken into account, the settlement rates for all
cases scheduled for conferences drops to 10% in Richmond
County, 9.3% in Bronx County, 4.4% in Queens and Kings
Counties, 4.3% in Westchester County, and 3.9% in Nassau
and Suffolk Counties. The success rate might appear modest
in terms of overall percentages, but it is significant to the
several hundreds of families whose homes were spared as a
result of the settlement efforts overseen by the courts.
As a practical matter, settlements will not occur unless
both parties are truly interested in reaching an arrangement
that saves the borrower’s home while meeting the legitimate
financial interests of the lender. Settlements will also prove
impossible when a borrower’s financial circumstances have
declined to where a proposed restructured payment schedule is
not viable for the borrower. Typically, settlements will not be
reached during the initial conference between the court and the
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parties, as the borrower must often provide further information
to assist the lender in calculating an offer that restructures
mortgage payments. The parties must, therefore, appear at the
court on two or three occasions before any settlement can be
finalized. The need for multiple conferences means that the
statistics for settlements will often lag behind the statistics of
the conferences that are shown to have been scheduled.
Statistics maintained by certain counties reveal that the rate of
adjournments is 73% in Nassau County, 66.3% in Westchester
County, and 60% in Queens County.147 The settlement success
rate should be expected to ultimately exceed the current
reported statistics, as these statistics do not reflect the
significant number of cases for which scheduled settlement
conferences have been adjourned or for continuing conferences
that have not yet run their course.
Two authors on the subject suggest that CPLR 3408 could
be rendered more meaningful if the settlement conference
included a mediation component,148 akin to that required under
New Jersey’s statewide Mortgage Stabilization and Relief
Act149 and the Housing Assistance and Recovery Program150
that became effective on January 9, 2009.151 In New Jersey,
lenders that have commenced residential mortgage foreclosure
actions are subject to a six-month forbearance period that
prohibits efforts to remove the borrower from the property,
during which time the lender and borrower are to participate in
a non-binding court-sponsored mediation program.152
147. Statistics provided by the OCA via e-mail on October 20, 2009 for
Queens, Kings, Richmond, Bronx, Nassau, and Suffolk Counties.
Westchester statistics separately provided via e-mail by Nancy Barry, Esq.,
dated October 26, 2009.
148. Tolchinsky & Wertheim, supra note 13.
149. 2008 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 127 (West) (codified at N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 55:14K-1 to -82 (West 2009)).
150. 2008 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 127, §§ 9-14 (West) (codified at N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 55:14K-88 to -93).
151. 2008 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 127 (West).
152. See Assembly Appropriations Committee Statement, N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 55:14K-82 (West 2009). The concept of a forbearance period is being
considered in the New York State Legislature. As of this writing, a bill is
pending in the New York Assembly—A06756—which will, if enacted, amend
RPAPL 1304 to impose a one-year foreclosure moratorium between the time
the lender proves entitlement to a judgment and the court order that
transfers title. The proposed legislation is expressly subject to a three-year
sunset provision. No corresponding bill yet appears to be pending in the New
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Another neighboring state, Connecticut, offers foreclosure
litigants a mediation option as well.153
Complaints in
residential foreclosure actions must attach a notice form by
which the borrower may request mediation.154 The Connecticut
court has three days from receipt of the request to notify the
parties of the mediation,155 which is to be held within fifteen
days of its noticed scheduling156 and completed within sixty
days of the ―return date‖ of the foreclosure action.157 The State
of Connecticut appropriated $2 million to fund its mediation
program.158
IV. The Appointment of Counsel for Those in Need
The intended importance of the foreclosure settlement
conference is underscored by CPLR 3408(b), which provides
that any defendant appearing for the conference pro se is
―deemed‖ to have made an application for the appointment of
counsel as a poor person.159 In other words, the statute
contains a legal presumption that an unrepresented defendant
is a poor person seeking the appointment of counsel. The
application for counsel invokes CPLR 1101.160 CPLR 1101(a)
requires, as a matter of procedure, that the pro se parties
seeking assigned counsel file an affidavit setting forth their
amount and sources of income, a listing of property owned and
its value(s), their inability to pay the expenses of the litigation,
the facts and nature of the action, and whether any other
person who has a beneficial interest in the action is also unable
to assist with litigation expenses.161 The counsel provisions of
CPLR 3408(b) and 1101(a) have the practical effect of requiring
York State Senate. See generally New York State Assembly, A06756
Summary, http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A06756 (last visited Feb. 15,
2010).
153. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 49-31l; 49-31m (2008).
154. Id. § 49-31l(c)(1).
155. Id. §§ 49-31l(c)(2); 49-31n(b)(1).
156. Id. § 49-31n(b)(2).
157. Id. § 49-31n(c)(1).
158. See N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS. Report, supra note 11, at 9-10.
159. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408(b) (McKinney 2009).
160. Id.
161. See generally Teeter v. Reed, 395 N.Y.S.2d 282 (App. Div. 1977); In
re S. Tier Legal Servs., 420 N.Y.S.2d 591 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
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the court to make available in the courtroom the necessary
forms that must be filled out for the pro se applicant to
potentially meet the requirements for the appointment of
counsel.
The court has discretion to grant or deny applications for
appointed counsel.162 Presumably, foreclosure defendants who
receive appointed counsel would be entitled to the related
benefits of CPLR 1102 that attach upon the appointment of
counsel, such as the county’s payment of stenographic
transcript expenses and the waiver of court costs.163
When a defendant’s application for assigned counsel is
granted at the mandatory settlement conference, CPLR 3408(b)
directs that the conference be continued on a later date for the
appearance and participation of the assigned attorney.164 The
availability of a mechanism for the appointment of counsel to
eligible defendants is significant.
Defendants subject to
foreclosure upon the subprime, high-cost, and nontraditional
mortgages contemplated by CPLR 3408 are likely to
disproportionally represent poor and minority households.165
However, while CPLR 3408(b) created a statutory right to
assigned counsel in covered mortgage foreclosure actions, the
statute did not provide any underlying funding of assigned
counsel. The statutory amendments enacted in 2009 likewise
contain no funding for assigned counsel, and in fact declared
the amendments to be revenue-neutral.166 Courts that find
162. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1101(a). See also Smith v. Smith, 2 N.Y.2d 120
(1956); Abbott v. Conway, 539 N.Y.S.2d 538 (App. Div. 1989); Bridges v.
Univ. of Rochester, 468 N.Y.S.2d 732 (App. Div. 1983); Howell v. Francesco,
738 N.Y.S.2d 168 (Civ. Ct. 2001).
163. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1102(b), (d). Conceivably, foreclosure actions within
the jurisdictional limits of the Civil Courts could be brought in such courts,
see Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 7B,
CPLR C3408; N.Y. City Civ. Ct. Act 203, in which case the city would
presumably assume expenses for stenographic transcripts. See N.Y. C.P.L.R.
1102(a).
164. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408(b).
165. Powell & Roberts, supra note 10; Fernandez, supra note 10.
166. New York State Senate, S66007: Relates to home mortgage loans,
the crime of mortgage fraud, and appropriations to the NYS housing trust
fund corporation, http://open.nysenate.gov/openleg/api/1.0/html/bill/S66007
(last visited Feb. 15, 2010) (―BUDGET IMPLICATIONS: This bill will not
have an impact on State finances.‖); New York State Assembly, Summary –
A40007, http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A40007 (last visited Feb. 15,
2010) (―BUDGET IMPLICATIONS: This bill will not have an impact on State
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defendants eligible for assigned counsel, therefore, refer
defendants to legal service organizations, bar associations, and
lists of available pro se attorneys, but there is no guarantee
that such referrals will actually result in attorney-client
representation. The Brennan Center for Justice at New York
University School of Law found that in Queens County between
November 2008 and May 2009, 84% of defendants in
foreclosure actions involving subprime, high-cost, and
nontraditional
mortgages
were
without
full
legal
167
The figures for Richmond and Nassau
representation.
Counties were estimated by the OCA as 91% and 92%,
respectively.168 These figures are not fully representative of
reality, as they do not include instances of legal representation
for ―incidental‖ or ―additional‖ defendants, nor do they account
for the many defendants who default by failing to answer
plaintiffs’ complaints or who fail to attend the settlement
conferences,169 thereby skewing the percentages higher. The
figures may also include pro se defendants who requested
assigned counsel but were found to be ineligible for it.
The more accurate method of gauging the level of attorney
representation at mandated residential foreclosure settlement
conferences is to examine the number of cases where attorneys
appear on behalf of defendants at conferences that are actually
conducted. Recent OCA figures for Queens County (current to
October 1, 2009) demonstrate that attorneys appeared on
behalf of defendants in 570 of the 1,103 conferences that were
conducted, representing 51.7% of those conferences.170
Nevertheless, the percentages suggest that CPLR 3408(b) may
not be sufficiently meeting its stated overall mission of
providing legal representation to defendants facing the loss of
their homes as a result of subprime, high-cost, and nontraditional mortgage foreclosures.
The counsel provision in CPLR 3408 is important,
considering that the vast majority of foreclosure plaintiffs are
finances.‖).
167. CLARK & BARRON, supra note 16, at 14.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 14 n.66.
170. Statistics provided by the OCA by e-mail on October 20, 2009 for
Queens County, compiled from the Foreclosure Settlement Conference Part
from October 2, 2008 to October 1, 2009.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/3

38

2010]

THE NEWLY-ENACTED CPLR 3408

893

institutions that commence the litigations through counsel.
One responsibility of all attorneys is to assure a good faith
basis for the actions they commence.171
Moreover, once
foreclosure actions are commenced, the lenders’ attorneys often
fast-track the litigations with motions for summary judgment
under CPLR 3212. Appellate cases are legion that lenders
establish their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment
merely by evidencing to the court the mortgage, the unpaid
note, and the borrower’s default.172 Since it is not uncommon
171. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 130-1.1a (2007).
172. See, e.g., Emigrant Mortgage Co., Inc. v. Turk, 895 N.Y.S.2d 722
(App. Div. 2010); Cassara v. Wynn, 864 N.Y.S.2d 362 (App. Div. 2008), leave
to appeal dismissed, 874 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2009); Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v.
Delphonse, 883 N.Y.S.2d 135 (App. Div. 2009); Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A. v.
O’Connor, 880 N.Y.S.2d 696 (App. Div. 2009); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v.
Webster, 877 N.Y.S.2d 200 (App. Div. 2009); Yildiz v. Vural Mgmt. Corp., 877
N.Y.S.2d 466 (App. Div. 2009); Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v. Thomas, 862
N.Y.S.2d 89 (App. Div. 2008); Rose v. Levine, 861 N.Y.S.2d 374 (App. Div.
2008); Popular Fin. Servs., LLC v. Williams, 855 N.Y.S.2d 581 (App. Div.
2008); US Bank Nat’l Ass’n Tr. U/S 6/01/08 (Home Equity Home Trust 19982) v. Alvarez, 854 N.Y.S.2d 171 (App. Div. 2008); Charter One Bank, FSB v.
Leone, 845 N.Y.S.2d 513 (App. Div. 2007); Aames Funding Corp. v. Houston,
843 N.Y.S.2d 660 (App. Div. 2007); Red Tulip, LLC v. Neiva, 842 N.Y.S.2d 1,
5 (App. Div. 2007); Wells Fargo Bank Minn., N.A. v. Mastropaolo, 837
N.Y.S.2d 247, 251-52 (App. Div. 2007); Daniel Perla Assocs. v. 101 Kent
Assocs., 836 N.Y.S.2d 630 (App. Div. 2007); Witelson v. Jamaica Estates
Holding Corp. I, 835 N.Y.S.2d 179 (App. Div. 2007); Cochran Inv. Co. v.
Jackson, 834 N.Y.S.2d 198 (App. Div. 2007); Marculescu v. Ovanez, 815
N.Y.S.2d 598 (App. Div. 2006); Campaign v. Barba, 805 N.Y.S.2d 86 (App.
Div. 2005); NC Venture I, L.P. v. Complete Analysis, Inc., 803 N.Y.S.2d 95,
98 (App. Div. 2005); Household Fin. Realty Corp. of N.Y. v. Winn, 796
N.Y.S.2d 533 (App. Div. 2005); LPP Mortgage, Ltd. v. Card Corp., 793
N.Y.S.2d 346 (App. Div. 2005); Fleet Nat’l Bank v. Olasov, 793 N.Y.S.2d 52
(App. Div. 2005); U.S. Bank Trust N.A. v. Butti, 792 N.Y.S.2d 505 (App. Div.
2005); Larkville Manor, Inc. v. KBK Enters., LLC, 772 N.Y.S.2d 591 (App.
Div. 2004); Coppa v. Fabozzi, 773 N.Y.S.2d 604 (App. Div. 2004); Republic
Nat’l Bank of N.Y. v. O’Kane, 764 N.Y.S.2d 635 (App. Div. 2003); Marshall v.
Alaliewie, 757 N.Y.S.2d 162, 163 (App. Div. 2003); Tower Funding, Ltd. v.
David Berry Realty, Inc., 755 N.Y.S.2d 413 (App. Div. 2003); M&T Mortgage
Corp. v. Ethridge, 751 N.Y.S.2d 741 (App. Div. 2002); Credit-Based Asset
Servicing & Securitization, LLC v. Grimmer, 750 N.Y.S.2d 673 (App. Div.
2002); EMC Mortgage Corp. v. Riverdale Assocs., 737 N.Y.S.2d 114 (App. Div.
2002); Fleet Bank v. Pine Knoll Corp., 736 N.Y.S.2d 737, 739 (App. Div.
2002); IMC Mortgage Co. v. Griggs, 733 N.Y.S.2d 918 (App. Div. 2001);
Schantz v. O’Sullivan, 731 N.Y.S.2d 808 (App. Div. 2001); Paterson v.
Rodney, 727 N.Y.S.2d 333 (App. Div. 2001); Sansone v. Cavallaro, 727
N.Y.S.2d 516 (App. Div. 2001); United Companies Lending Corp. v. Hingos,
724 N.Y.S.2d 134, 135 (App. Div. 2001); Republic Nat’l Bank of N.Y. v. Zito,
721 N.Y.S.2d 244 (App. Div. 2001); Simoni v. Time-Line, Ltd., 708 N.Y.S.2d
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for financial institutions to sell and assign mortgages and
notes, a plaintiff that is an assignee must also tender evidence
that it received the mortgage and note by a proper prior
assignment.173 The plaintiff’s initial burden is not particularly
difficult for institutional lenders to meet since it relies on
readily-accessible documentation. Once the plaintiff’s prima
facie burden is met, the burden shifts to the borrower
defendant to establish, through admissible evidence, the
existence of a triable issue of fact as a defense to the action,174
142 (App. Div. 2000); Delta Funding Corp. v. Yaede, 702 N.Y.S.2d 854 (App.
Div. 2000); Sinardi v. Rivera, 689 N.Y.S.2d 236 (App. Div. 1999); First Union
Nat’l Bank v. Weston, 689 N.Y.S.2d 543, 545 (App. Div. 1999); Hoffman v.
Kraus, 688 N.Y.S.2d 575, 576 (App. Div. 1999); Mahopac Nat’l Bank v.
Baisley, 664 N.Y.S.2d 345 (App. Div. 1997); Bercy Investors, Inc. v. Sun, 657
N.Y.S.2d 47 (App. Div. 1997); Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v.
Karastathis, 655 N.Y.S.2d 631 (App. Div. 1997); Chem. Bank v. Bowers, 643
N.Y.S.2d 653 (App. Div.1996); DiNardo v. Patcam Serv. Station, Inc., 644
N.Y.S.2d 779 (App. Div. 1996); N. Fork Bank v. Hamptons Mist Mgmt. Corp.,
639 N.Y.S.2d 452 (App. Div.1996); Home Sav. Bank v. Schorr Bros. Dev.
Corp., 624 N.Y.S.2d 53 (App. Div. 1995); Governor & Co. of the Bank of
Ireland v. Dromoland Castle Ltd., 624 N.Y.S.2d 855 (App. Div. 1995); Zitel
Corp. v. Fonar Corp., 619 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. Div. 1994); Vill. Bank v. Wild
Oaks Holding, Inc., 601 N.Y.S.2d 940 (App. Div. 1993); Silber v. Muschel, 593
N.Y.S.2d 306 (App. Div. 1993); Metro. Distrib. Servs. v. DiLascio, 574
N.Y.S.2d 755 (App. Div. 1991); Marton Asss. v. Vitale, 568 N.Y.S.2d 119, 121
(App. Div. 1991); Gateway State Bank v. Shangri-La Private Club for
Women, 493 N.Y.S.2d 226 (App. Div. 1985), aff’d, 67 N.Y.2d 627 (1986).
173. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 13-105 (McKinney 2009). See also
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Marchione, 887 N.Y.S.2d 615 (App. Div. 2009);
LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ahearn, 875 N.Y.S.2d 595, 597 (App. Div. 2009);
Bankers Trust Co. v. Hoovis, 694 N.Y.S.2d 245, 247 (App. Div. 1999); 20 East
17th St. LLC v. 4 M Dev. Co., 666 N.Y.S.2d 912 (App. Div. 1998); Kluge v.
Fugazy, 536 N.Y.S.2d 92 (App. Div. 1988); Bercy Investors, Inc. v. Sun, 657
N.Y.S.2d 47 (App. Div. 1997); RCR Servs. Inc. v. Herbil Holding Co., 645
N.Y.S.2d 76 (App. Div. 1996); Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Taylor, 843
N.Y.S.2d 495, 497 (Sup. Ct. 2007).
174. See Nassau Trust Co. v. Montrose Concrete Prods. Corp., 436
N.E.2d 1265 (N.Y. 1982); State Bank of Albany v. Fioravanti, 417 N.E.2d 60
(N.Y. 1980); HSBC Bank USA v. Merrill, 830 N.Y.S.2d 598, 599 (App. Div.
2007); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Ajuda, 730 N.Y.S.2d 871 (App. Div. 2000);
Rose, 861 N.Y.S.2d at 374; Alvarez, 854 N.Y.S.2d at 171; Leone, 845 N.Y.S.2d
at 513; Neiva, 842 N.Y.S.2d at 6; Houston, 843 N.Y.S.2d at 660; Jackson, 833
N.Y.S.2d at 542; LaSalle Bank N.A. v. Kosarovich, 820 N.Y.S.2d 144, 145
(App. Div. 2006); Household Fin. Realty Corp. of N.Y. v. Winn, 796 N.Y.S.2d
533 (App. Div. 2005); Olasov, 793 N.Y.S.2d at 52; Butti, 792 N.Y.S.2d at 505;
Marshall, 757 N.Y.S. at 163; Etheridge, 751 N.Y.S.2d at 741-42; EMC
Mortgage Corp., 737 N.Y.S.2d at 114; Fleet Bank, 736 N.Y.S.2d at 739;
Schantz, 731 N.Y.S.2d 808-09; Paterson, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 333; Sansone, 727
N.Y.S.2d at 517; Hingos, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 135; Credit Based Asset Servicing &
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such as, but not limited to, waiver, estoppel, bad faith, fraud, or
oppressive or unconscionable conduct on the part of the
plaintiff.175 Counsel can be of crucial importance to defendants
in navigating the summary judgment process.
The benefits of having counsel at foreclosure settlement
conferences are also easy to imagine. Attorneys may advise
defendants of potential legal defenses specifically related to,
inter alia, the federal Truth in Lending Act (―TILA‖),176 the
Securitization v. Castelli, 711 N.Y.S.2d 624, 625 (App. Div. 2000); Simoni,
708 N.Y.S.2d at 142; Weston, 689 N.Y.S.2d at 544; Green Point Sav. Bank v.
Spivey, 676 N.Y.S.2d 228 (App. Div. 1998); Trustco Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v.
Labriola, 667 N.Y.S.2d 450 (App. Div. 1998); Baisley, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 346;
Bercy Investors, Inc., 657 N.Y.S.2d at 47; Karastathis, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 630;
DiNardo, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 779; N. Fork Bank, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 452;
Naugatuck Sav. Bank v. Gross, 625 N.Y.S.2d 572 (App. Div. 1995); Zitel, 619
N.Y.S.2d at 964; Vill. Bank, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 940; DiLascio, 574 N.Y.S.2d at
755; Vitale, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 120.
175. See, e.g., Nassau Trust Co., 56 N.Y.2d at 183; State Bank of Albany
v. Fioravanti, 417 N.E.2d 60, 64 (N.Y. 1980); Ferlazzo v. Riley, 16 N.E.2d 286
(N.Y. 1938); Kitain v. Windley, 724 N.Y.S.2d 641 (App. Div. 2001); Aurora
Loan Servs., LLC v. Thomas, 862 N.Y.S.2d 89 (App. Div. 2008); U.S. Bank
Nat’l Ass’n Tr. U/S 6/01/08 (Home Equity Loan Trust 1998-2) v. Alvarez, 854
N.Y.S.2d 171 (App. Div. 2008); Cochran Inv. Co. v. Jackson, 834 N.Y.S.2d 198
(App. Div. 2007); Sansone v. Cavallaro, 727 N.Y.S.2d 516, 517 (App. Div.
2001); First Union Nat’l Bank v. Weston, 689 N.Y.S.2d 543, 545 (App. Div.
1999); Sinardi v. Rivera, 689 N.Y.S.2d 236 (App. Div. 1999); Hoffman v.
Kraus, 688 N.Y.S.2d 575 (App. Div. 1999); EBC Amro Asset Mgmt. Ltd. v.
Kaiser, 681 N.Y.S.2d 539 (App. Div. 1998); 192 Sheridan Corp. v. O’Brien,
676 N.Y.S.2d 351 (App. Div. 1998); Mahopac Nat’l Bank v. Baisley, 664
N.Y.S.2d 345 (App. Div. 1997); N. Fork Bank v. Hamptons Mist Mgmt. Corp.,
639 N.Y.S.2d 452 (App. Div. 1996); River Bank Am. v. Daniel Equities Corp.,
624 N.Y.S.2d 287, 289 (App. Div. 1995); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Transgrow Realty Corp., 475 N.Y.S.2d 418 (App. Div. 1984); Fremont Inv. &
Loan v. Haley, 889 N.Y.S.2d 505, No. 51186(U), 2009 WL 1636915, at *1
(Sup. Ct. June 11, 2009) (unreported disposition).
176. Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, tit. I, 82 Stat. 146 (1968)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 to 1667f (2006)). TILA was
enacted to ―assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that
[consumers] will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms
available to [them] and avoid the uninformed use of credit.‖ Deutsche Bank
Nat’l Trust v. West, 22 Misc.3d 1132(A), No. 38830/07, 2009 WL 606661, at *1
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 10, 2009) (citing Fiorenza v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, No. 08858, 2008 WL 2517139 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2008)). See generally Mortgage
Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Maniscalco, 848 N.Y.S.2d 766 (App. Div. 2007);
JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Tecl, 808 N.Y.S.2d 432 (App. Div. 2005); Delta
Funding Corp. v. Murdaugh, 774 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Div. 2004); Bankers
Trust Co. of Cal., N.A. v. Ward, 703 N.Y.S.2d 504 (App. Div. 2000); Berkeley
Fed. Bank & Trust, FSB v. Siegel, 669 N.Y.S.2d 334 (App. Div. 1998);
Horowitz v. Griggs, 666 N.Y.S.2d 480 (App. Div. 1997); First Trust Nat’l
Ass’n v. Chiang, 662 N.Y.S.2d 136 (App. Div. 1997); HSBC Bank USA v.
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Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (―RESPA‖)177 and
bankruptcy laws, the New York State Home Equity Theft
Protection Act178 and Deceptive Practices Act,179 and statutory
Picarelli, 889 N.Y.S.2d 882, No. 51107(U), 2009 WL 1585773 (Sup. Ct. Apr.
14, 2009) (unreported disposition); LaSalle Bank, NA v. Shearon, 881
N.Y.S.2d 599, 602 (Sup. Ct. 2009); Sutherland v. Remax 2000, 20 Misc.3d
1131(A), No. 51701(U), 2008 WL 3307201 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 7, 2008)
(unreported disposition); Fremont Inv. & Loan v. Edwardsen, 867 N.Y.S.2d
374, No. 51349(U), 2008 WL 2653287 (Sup. Ct. June 18, 2008); Collier v.
Home Plus Assocs., 856 N.Y.S.2d 497, No. 52526(U), 2007 WL 4793201 (Sup.
Ct. Dec. 21, 2007) (unreported disposition); Aurora Loan Servs. v. Grant, 851
N.Y.S.2d 56, No. 51793(U), 2007 WL 2768915 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 29, 2007)
(unreported disposition); Beneficial Homeowner Serv. Corp. v. Butler, 836
N.Y.S.2d 491, No. 50278(U), 2007 WL 5192276 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 16, 2007)
(unreported disposition); Bank of N.Y. v. Walden, 751 N.Y.S.2d 341 (Sup. Ct.
2002); Bankers Trust v. McFarland, 743 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 2002);
Bankers Trust Co. of Cal. v. Payne, 730 N.Y.S.2d 200 (Sup. Ct. 2001); Gender
Servs., Inc. v. Johnson, 439 N.Y.S.2d 794 (Sup. Ct. 1981).
177. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-533,
88 Stat. 1724 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-17 (2006)). RESPA
requires mortgage lenders and mortgage brokers, to the extent they are not
the lender’s exclusive agent, to disclose costs associated with federally-related
mortgage loans at real estate closings, typically through the use of a standard
―HUD-1‖ form. 12 U.S.C §§ 2603, 2604(c) (2006). See also 24 C.F.R. § 3500.7
(2009). See generally Fremont Inv. & Loan v. Haley, 889 N.Y.S.2d 505, No.
135592007, 2009 WL 1636915 (Sup. Ct. June 11, 2009) (unreported
disposition); Cruz v. HSBC Bank, N.A., 21 Misc.3d 1143(A), No. 100629/2008,
2008 WL 5191428 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 12, 2008) (unreported disposition);
Sutherland v. Remax 2000, 20 Misc.3d 1131(A), No. 22405/2007, 2008 WL
3307201 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 7, 2008) (unreported disposition); Bankers Trust v.
McFarland, 743 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 2002).
178. Home Equity Theft Protection Act, 2006 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 308
(codified as amended at N.Y. BANKING LAW § 595-a (McKinney 2009)); N.Y.
REAL PROP. LAW § 265-a). The law is intended to protect homeowners in
financial distress—particularly those who are poor, elderly, or financially
unsophisticated—from selling their home equity for a fraction of its fair
market value as a result of misrepresentations, deceit, intimidation, or other
unreasonable commercial practices by equity purchasers. N.Y. REAL PROP.
LAW § 265-a(1)(a). The statute provides that the terms and conditions of
equity purchases be set forth in written agreements that must conform with
statutory requirements regarding print size, the identity of parties, the
consideration recited, the description of the mortgaged property, terms of
payment, terms of lease or reconveyance, notice of cancellation, and duration.
Id. § 265-a(3)-(7). Non-compliance with the provisions of RPL 265-a
precludes equity purchasers from obtaining or enforcing judgments of
foreclosure and sale for the property. See First Nat’l Bank of Chicago v.
Silver, No. 2010-02511, 2010 WL 1078805 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 23, 2010)
(holding that a plaintiff mortgagee’s service of the statutorily-specific HETPA
notice upon the defendant mortgagor with the summons and complaint is a
condition precedent that must be affirmatively pleaded and proven, and that
the mortgagee’s failure to do so requires the dismissal of the foreclosure
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protections against high-cost home loans,180 and may help
renegotiate payment terms and assure that relevant legal
procedures are followed.181
The availability of appointed counsel, of course, implicates
federal and state funding for assigned legal services. An
editorial published in the New York Times on October 9, 2009,
lamented that funding for assigned counsel in home foreclosure
litigations is not adequate and urged higher state and federal
funding of programs earmarked for that purpose.182 A bill has
been introduced in the New York State Assembly—A00464—
which, if enacted, will expand defendants’ rights to assigned
counsel.183 A corresponding bill has yet to be sponsored in the
New York State Senate, and, given New York’s well-publicized
budget difficulties, the future funding of assigned counsel in
mortgage foreclosure actions may prove problematic.
Pro bono legal services are necessary to the success of
proceeding); WMC Mortgage Corp. v. Thompson, 877 N.Y.S.2d 885, 886 (Sup.
Ct. 2009); Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. v. Eisenberg, 890 N.Y.S.2d 368, No.
51271(U), 2009 WL 1789407 (Sup. Ct. June 23, 2009) (unreported
disposition); HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Boucher, No. 27200-2008, 2009 WL
2355630 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009) (unreported disposition); Wash. Mut. Bank v.
Sholomov, 862 N.Y.S.2d 890, 893-94 (Sup. Ct. 2008); Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc. v. Taylor, 843 N.Y.S.2d 495, 498-99 (Sup. Ct. 2007). But see
Trustco Bank v. Alexander, 23 Misc. 3d 1129(A), No. 2009-50996(U), 2009
WL 1425247 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 9, 2009) (unreported disposition).
179. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349. The statute prohibits consumerorientated acts or practices that are misleading in a material way and which
cause injury to the party seeking relief, Stutman v. Chemical Bank, 95
N.Y.2d 24 (2000); N.Y. Univ. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 662 N.E.2d 763 (N.Y. 1995);
Oswego Laborers’ Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank, 647
N.E.2d 741 (N.Y. 1995); Negrin v. Norwest Mortgage, 700 N.Y.S.2d 184 (App.
Div. 1999), and has been raised in mortgage foreclosure actions wherein the
loan is alleged to be predatory. See generally Delta Funding Corp. v.
Murdaugh, 774 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Div. 2004); Schimenti v. Whitman &
Ransom, 617 N.Y.S.2d 742 (App. Div. 1994); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v.
Robinson, 25 Misc.3d 1211(A), No. 52029(U), 2009 WL 3210306 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Oct. 7, 2009); Cruz v. HSBC Bank, N.A., 21 Misc.3d 1143(A), No. 5191428,
2008 WL 5191428, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 12, 2008) (unreported
disposition); Fremont Inv. & Loan v. Laroc, Misc.3d 1124(A), No. 52166(U),
2008 WL 4764809 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 8, 2008) (unreported disposition); Banc of
Am. Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Issacharoff, 728 N.Y.S.2d 861 (Sup. Ct. 2000).
180. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-l(1) (McKinney 2009).
181. See CLARK & BARRON, supra note 16, at 17-25.
182. Editorial, Another Kind of Foreclosure Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9,
2009, at A30. See also CLARK & BARRON, supra note 16, at 28-30.
183. New
York
State
Assembly,
Summary
A00464,
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A00464 (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).
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CPLR 3408 in its current form. The New York City Bar
Association (―NYCBA‖) and the Federal Reserve Bank have cosponsored the Lawyers’ Foreclosure Intervention Network
(―LFIN‖), which provides pro bono legal services for low-income
homeowners facing foreclosure.184 The program, administered
by the NYCBA, trains volunteer attorneys to assist
homeowners in (1) assessing their options, (2) negotiating their
re-finance arrangements, and (3) defending their cases.185 A
similar program, the Mortgage Foreclosure Pro Bono Project,
has been established in Nassau County through the
collaboration of the County, the Attorney General’s office, and
Nassau/Suffolk Legal Services.186 This program provides pro
bono consultation services for homeowners in need.187 Pro bono
services will become less necessary only to the extent that the
state finds funding for the increased demand for assigned
counsel generated by the enactment of CPLR 3408.
V. Conclusion
The latter part of 2008, along with 2009 and 2010,
represent uncertain economic times. The burst of the ―housing
bubble‖ has been acknowledged as a significant factor in the
downturn of the national economy.188 The increase in mortgage
foreclosures is a sign of the distressed housing market, and it
impedes any recovery of that market specifically and the
economy generally. Statutes that help reduce the number of
foreclosure auctions and keep families in their homes can,
theoretically, if not in fact, help stabilize the housing market
and help families and communities.
CPLR 3408 provides a settlement conference mechanism to
184. N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS. Report, supra note 11, at 5. See
also
Foreclosure
Project:
Overview,
http://www.nycbar.org/citybarjusticecenter/projects/economicjustice/foreclosure-project/overview (last visited Oct. 16, 2009).
185. N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS. Report, supra note 11, at 5.
186. Id. at 6.
187. Nassau County Bar Association, Legal Services, Mortgage
Foreclosure
Legal
Consultation
Clinics,
http://www.nassaubar.org/For%20The%20Public/Legal_Services.aspx
(last
visited Mar. 29, 2010).
188. See, e.g., Steven Gjerstad & Vernon L. Smith, From Bubble to
Depression?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2009, at A15.
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help achieve a laudable goal. It is the responsibility of the
courts to properly navigate any procedural pitfalls presented by
the statute’s draftsmanship, such as issues involving the filing
of proofs of service and RJIs, and to implement the purpose and
intent of CPLR 3408 to the best extent possible.
The
availability and funding of assigned attorneys for financiallystrapped defendants remains, as of this writing, a continuing
problem. The courts’ greatest contributions with regard to
CPLR 3408 will be the expected investment of serious,
proactive time and effort in the settlement conferences
themselves, to restructure payment terms in a manner that is
acceptable to all parties and that keeps families in their homes.
This is true even if the rate of settlements arising out of the
mandated conferences remains in the modest 5.3% to 16%
range.
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